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STUDENT CONTRIBUTION
Dispensation of Justice by
the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia: A Critical
Appraisal
M. Ehteshamul Bari�
This article examines the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
established to try those responsible for the atrocities perpetrated against the
Cambodian people by the former Khmer Rouge Regime (1975-1979). It focuses on the
trial of the first case conducted by the ECCC which resulted in the ‘lenient’
judgment. The paper then outlines in details the factors such as political interference,
corrupt practices and inordinate delay of the legal process which are undermining the
ECCC’s credibility to administer fair justice to the victims of genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes. Finally, it stresses on the fact that the failure of the ECCC
and its stakeholders to duly address these fundamental issues would end in the
farcical dispensation of justice.
Keywords
ECCC, War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, Genocide, Political
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I. Introduction
The ‘Ultra-Maoist’Khmer Rouge, which came to power in Cambodia in 1975 and
deposed by the Vietnamese troops after nearly 4 years of its reign in 1979, annihilated
1.7 million people in the ‘killing fields’- about a quarter of Cambodia’s population at
that time.1 In order to do justice to the victims of the mass atrocities of the Khmer Rouge
regime, and to achieve the wider objective of preventing the perpetration of such mass
atrocities in the future, the United Nations assisted the Cambodian government to
establish the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”), a hybrid
tribunal.2 It became fully functional in June 2007 after lengthy and troublesome
negotiations,3 to bring to trial ‘senior’and “most responsible leaders”of the Khmer
Rouge4 accused of committing genocide,5 war crimes,6“crimes against humanity,”7 and
194 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1 The communist Khmer Rouge under the leadership of Pol Pot backed by China opposed the Government led by
popular leader Norodom Sihanouk. It gained support after Sihanouk was toppled by Lon Nol (1970) having the
support and blessings of the United States. In between the two forces, a new force of communist Vietnamese fighters
emerged and sought refuge in the neutral territory that was Cambodia at that time. Ultimately, secret US bombings,
which allegedly caused more than 150,000 casualties, probably paved the way for Pol Pot, the leader of communist
Khmer Rouge, and his troops to take up power. On April 17, 1975, Pol Pot’s troops marched into Phnom Penh. Their
proclamation of ‘Year Zero’opened up an era of terror and horror. In one single week, the 2.5 million citizens from
Phnom Penh were forced out to the countryside. The Ultra-Maoist Khmers mercilessly held to the maxim: “Keeping
you is no benefit, losing you is no loss.”The regime launched a revolution in which all pre-existing economic, social
and cultural institutions were destroyed, all foreign influences were wiped out and the entire population was
transformed into a collective work force. The Khmer Rouge set out to kill anyone who could possibly thwart its goal of
creating a new society, including those among its own ranks whom were viewed as potential dissidents. It perceived
‘intellectuals’such as doctors, teachers, lawyers, students and those capable of speaking a foreign language as
particularly threatening a the mere fact of appearing to be intellectual by wearing spectacles was sufficient reason to
be condemned to death. An unknown number of persons were thrown into slavery, arbitrarily executed, or died of
starvation, disease or exhaustion in labour camps. In the space of 4 years, the Khmer Rouge genocide extinguished
1.7 million people in the ‘killing fields,’or about a quarter of Cambodia’s population at that time. For further
information, see II BRITANNICA READY REFERENCE ENCYCLOPAEDIA 134 (2007); Wendy Lambourne, The Khmer Rouge
Tribunal: Justice for Genocide in Cambodia? 3-4 (Law and Society Association and New Zealand (“LSAANZ”)
Conference, University of Sydney, Working Paper, Dec. 10-12, 2008), available at http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/
2123/4042/1/LSAANZ%20Lambourne%20Cambodia%20conf%20paper%20final.pdf  (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010);
Trial Watch, Criminal Court for Cambodia, available at http://www.trial-ch.org/index.php?id=923&L=5 (last visited
on Mar. 12, 2010). The Secretary-General, Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to
General Assembly Resoluation 52/135, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 110(b), U.N. Doc. A/53/850, at 9 & 13 (March 16,
1999); Theresa Klosterman, The Feasibility and Propriety of a Truth Commission in Cambodia: Too Little? Too
Late?, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 803, 849 (1998); and Rachel S. Taylor, Better Late Than Never, in INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW SERIES, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 237,
239 & 240 (Jane E. Stromseth ed., 2003). 
2 Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 295 (2003).
3 For a comprehensive overview of the ECCC, see John D. Ciorciari, History and Politics behind the Khmer Rouge
Trials, in ON TRIAL: THE KHMER ROUGE ACCOUNTABILITY PROCESS 33 (John D. Ciorciari & Anne Heindel eds., 2009). 
4 The Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers arts. 1 & 2, NS/RKM/1004/006 (2004).
5 Id. art. 4. 
other crimes under the Cambodian Penal Law8 during the period of April 17, 1975 to
January 6, 1979. Thus, those who assisted the Khmer Rouge in coming to power and
supported them after they were overthrown by the Vietnamese have been kept out of
the jurisdiction of the ECCC. Moreover, since trials have been limited to the senior
leaders of the Khmer Rouge Regime and those who were most responsible for the
crimes and serious violations, many of the lower perpetrators but responsible for
serious crimes would escape punishment, thereby adding to the “sense of impunity”
that has been prevailing in Cambodia for the last 30 years.9
The original plan of the Group of Experts,10 as envisioned in their Report to the
General Assembly and the Security Council in 1999,11 was a relatively simple two-tier
structure having a trial chamber and an appeal chamber. In the end, however, it was
settled upon a complicated three-tier structure encompassing a Pre-Trial Chamber, a
Trial Chamber and a Supreme Court Chamber.12 
The ECCC has a total of seventeen judges presiding in the abovementioned three
chambers. Both the Pre-Trial Chamber, which settles disagreements between the Co-
Prosecutors and Co-Investigating Judges, and the Trial Court Chamber are consisted of
three Cambodian and two international judges. Decisions delivered by these Chambers
require an ‘absolute majority,’that is, four of the five judges must agree in order to pass
a judgment. Similarly, the Supreme Court Chamber consists of four Cambodian and
three international judges, with decisions requiring the agreement of five judges.13 It is
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6 Id. art. 6. 
7 Id. art. 5.
8 Id. art. 8. 
9 Christina Son & Grant Niemann, Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers: A Mixed Tribunal Destined to Fail, 33 CRIM.
L. J. 105, 107 (2009).
10 In pursuance of paragraph 16 of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution entitled “Situation of Human
Rights in Cambodia.”See G.A. RES. 52/135, 52nd Sess., 70th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 112(b), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/52/135 (Dec. 12, 1997). The U.N. Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan established a “Group of Experts”with
three main goals: (1) to evaluate the existing evidence and determine the nature of the crimes committed [by the
Khmer Rouge leaders]; (2) to assess the feasibility of bringing Khmer Rouge leaders to justice; and (3) to explore
options for trials before international or domestic courts. See Steven R. Ratner, The United Nations Group of
Experts for Cambodia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 948-949 (1999). 
11 The Secretary-General, Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to General Assembly
Resolution 52/135, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 110(b), U.N. Doc. A/53/850 (Mar. 16, 1999). See also The Secretary-
General, Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution
52/135, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 110(b), U.N. Doc. S/1999/231 (Mar. 16, 1999).
12 Agreement to Establish an Independent Counsellor at the Extraordinary Chambers for the Courts in Cambodia, art.
3, infra note 128. See David Scheffer, The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 12 (Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2008), available at http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/CTM/
Cambodia%20Scheffer%20Abridged%20Chapter%20July%202007.pdf  (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
13 EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE KHMER ROUGE TRIALS (2008), available
at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/publications/an_introduction_to_Khmer_Rouge_Trials_3th.pdf (last
visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
evident that in each of the three chambers of the ECCC, an outcome would happen in
accordance with the desire of the Cambodian negotiators, because the majority of the
judges (3:2 except for the Supreme Court Chamber where the ratio is 4:3) are
Cambodians. This is a clear-cut departure from the original proposal of the Group of
Experts14 which envisaged that in trial chambers the majority of the judges would be
drawn from the international community, thereby ensuring impartiality and protection
from local political interference.15 Furthermore, the international judges as
recommended by the UN are ultimately appointed by the Supreme Council of the
Magistracy of Cambodia upon its satisfaction, while the national judges are internally
appointed without the scrutiny of the UN whatsoever.16 Additionally, the positions of
two investigating judges (one a Cambodian and the other a foreigner) and of two
prosecutors (one is a Cambodian and the other, a foreigner) were created at the ECCC
as a result of a compromise between the common law tradition of a strong prosecutor
and the civil law tradition of investigating judges.17
An attempt will be made in this paper to examine the trials conducted by the ECCC
critically, in particular with special reference to the judgment delivered in its first case.
Most importantly, the factors that are undermining ECCC’s ability to render credible
justice to the victims of genocide, war crimes and “crimes against humanity”in
Cambodia would be brought to the fore.
II. Trials of the Senior Leaders Charged
From July to November 2007, the ECCC detained 5 ‘senior leaders’who were ‘most
responsible’for war related crimes. The five accused persons were then implicated into
two cases: Case 001 against Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch for crimes that occurred at or in
conjunction with Tuol Sleng Prison (S-21) and Case 002 against Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary,
Ieng Thirith and Khieu Samphan for their preeminent leadership role in the Khmer
Rouge regime, which resulted in wide-spread atrocities throughout Cambodia for the
duration of the ECCC’s temporal jurisdiction.
Besides of the abovementioned 5 accused persons in custody, the international
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14 Scheffer, supra note 12, at 13.
15 Son & Niemann, supra note 9, at 106-107.
16 Suzannah Linton, Safeguarding the Independence and Impartiality of the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers, 4 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 327 (2006), available at http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/4/2/327 (last visited on Apr.
12, 2010).
17 Scheffer, supra note 12, at 13.
prosecutor submitted the names of 5 additional suspects in two separate cases [Cases
003 and 004] to the investigating judges on September 7, 2009 requesting formal judicial
investigation.18 The names of these suspects and the subject-matter of the investigation,
however, have been kept confidential19 and none of these additional suspects have yet
been formally charged or arrested.20
A. Trial of Kaing Guek Eav Alias Duch [Case 001]
1. Overview
On July 31, 2007, the Tribunal indicted its first suspect Kaing Guek Eav, also known as
‘Comrade Duch.’21 After the death of Ta Mok (The Butcher) while in custody in July
2006, Kaing Guek Eav, aged 67, is the youngest surviving member of the regime to be in
prison since 1999.22 A former math teacher, he used to be the Governor of the Tuol
Sleng Prison known as S-21, a centre of torture where he oversaw the job of extracting
confessions from prisoners of counter-revolutionary activity with fastidious attention to
detail23 and subsequently, ‘smash’24 them by striking “the base of the neck with a
metal bar,”slitting open “their throats or stomachs ... and [pushing] their bodies ... into
pits.”25 In Tuol Sleng Prison, an estimated 16,00026 inmates were tortured, enslaved and
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18 Open Society Justice Initiative, Recent Developments at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(Nov. 2009), available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/articles_publications/
publications/eccc_20091120 (last visited on Feb. 10, 2010).
19 Although the names of the accused in Cases 003/004 remain confidential, there are indications that the accused are
considered to be persons ‘most responsible’for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime (e.g. not the ‘senior
leaders’who constitute the Case 002 defendants). See Open Society Justice Initiative, Salvaging Independence: The
Need for a Principled Completion Plan for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, available at
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/articles_publications/publications/khmer-rouge-
tribunal-20101110/cambodia-khmer-rouge-20101110.pdf (last visited on Dec. 12, 2010).  
20 Id.
21 Case of Kaing Guek Eav, Case No. 001/18-07-2007, Order of Provisional Detention (July 21, 2007).
22 Khmer Rouge Leaders Facing Trial, BBC NEWS, Feb. 13, 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2856771.stm
(last visited on Mar. 5, 2010).
23 Kevin Doyle, Long-Delayed Justice in Cambodia, TIME, Nov. 21, 2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/
article/0,8599,1686601,00.html (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
24 As Duch explained to the Court, “to smash ... means to arrest secretly [to interrogate] with torture employed, and
then [to execute] secretly”without judicial process. Co-Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-
2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment, 100 (July 26, 2010).
25 Id. at 220.
26 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia officially found the number detained at S-21 to be at least
12,273. See Case 001, id. at 141-43. The actual number was ‘considerably greater.’Because of incomplete
documentary records, however, only 12,273 victims could be verified. Id. The tentative scholarly consensus is that
roughly 16,000 people perished at S-21. See Kenneth M. Quinn, Pattern and Scope of Violence, in CAMBODIA,
1975?1978: RENDEZVOUS WITH DEATH 198 (Karl D. Jackson ed., 1992).
murdered in the late 1970s,27 of whom only twelve or so are known to have survived.28
According to Vann Nath, one of the twelve survivors of the S-21, “.... Duch killed people
without consideration - whether they were elderly or children. What he did every day
during that time was slaughter.”29 Duch was accordingly charged with “crimes against
humanity,”war crimes, and torture30 and murder31 under the 1956 Cambodian Penal
Code.32
Ultimately, the trial of Duch began on February 17, 2009.33 Duch’s landmark hearing
evoked for many Cambodians attending the court a sense of wonderment that the
Khmer Rouge leadership was finally being taken into task.34 Duch’s right to adequate
legal representation, to a public trial, and to confront witnesses and have adequate time
and resources to present his defense, as specifically mandated in the Agreement
concluded between Cambodian and the UN through the incorporation of Articles 14
and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,35 were complied
with.36 As one of the goals of the ECCC is to contribute to reconciliation and an
enhanced understanding of justice in Cambodia,37 the Court needed to conduct the
Duch trial such a way that detailed factual testimony was presented and accessible to a
large number of Cambodians who were born after the Khmer Rouge regime. The lack,
until recently, of significant efforts to educate the public and particularly the younger
generation about the Khmer Rouge, has created a void in the understanding in
Cambodia about the Khmer Rouge legacy.38 A full evidentiary trial, easily accessible
through mass media to most Cambodians was necessary to meet the Court’s goals of
informing the public about the realities of the Khmer Rouge era. The Court’s efforts on
these fronts were commendable as about 28,000 people attended Duch’s trial at the
198 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27 Khmer Rouge Chief Stuns Court with Release Bid, BBC NEWS, Nov. 27, 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/asia-pacific/8382118.stm (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
28 Doyle, supra note 23; Open Society Justice Initiative, supra note 18.
29 Id.
30 The Cambodian Penal Code art. 500 (1956).
31 Id. arts. 501 & 503-508.
32 Open Society Justice Initiative, supra note 18.
33 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Case Information 001, 2009, available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/1 (last visited on Apr. 15, 2011).  
34 Doyle, supra note 23.
35 Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under
Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea art. 12(2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/
228B (June 6, 2003).
36 Open Society Justice Initiative, supra note 18.
37 INTRODUCTION TO THE KHMER ROUGE TRIALS (3d ed. 2008), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/
publications/ an_introduction_to_Khmer_Rouge_Trials_3th.pdf.  (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
38 Christopher Shay, The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: Cambodia’s Healing Process, TIME, Nov. 30, 2009, available at
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1943373,00.html (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
ECCC and millions more Cambodians followed the tribunal on television and radio.39
Thus, the chamber struck a good balance between the need to conduct an efficient trial
and the need to publicly present a complete picture of the atrocities committed at S-21
Prison, Duch’s alleged role in committing them, and the place of the prison in the
Khmer Rouge regime. The Court properly permitted the parties to present evidence on
all factual aspects of the case.40 The testimony of twenty-two civil parties who spoke
about their personal experiences at S-21 or the loss of family members added depth to
thorough public understanding of the suffering caused by the operations at the prison.41
Duch admitted guilt, but contended that everything he did was by the order of others.42
However, the major surprise came on the final day of the trial when Duch outraged the
UN-backed War Crime Tribunal by asking them to release him on the grounds that he
was not a member of the Khmer Rouge hierarchy.43 The judges did not pay heed to
Duch’s preposterous request and closed the proceedings.44 On July 26, 2010, the
Tribunal delivered its judgment against Duch.45
2. Judgment Delivered by the ECCC in Case 001
The ECCC found in Case 001 that Duch “willingly and zealously”46 instituted and
implemented a streamlined apparatus of torture to ensure that all detainees at S-21
confessed to betrayal of the regime, thus rationalising subsequent ‘smashing.’47
Moreover, by his own confession, Duch personally ordered and oversaw the torture of
detainees,48 which routinely included beatings, electrocution, asphyxiation with plastic
bags, and water-boarding.49 Torturers tore off and punctured prisoners’fingernails and
toenails, inserted needles into them, and force-fed them their own excrement and
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39 Id.
40 Open Society Justice Initiative, supra note 18.
41 Id.
42 Khmer Rouge Leader Admits Crimes, BBC NEWS, Mar. 31, 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/7973463.stm (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
43 Khmer Rouge Chief Stuns Court with Release Bid, BBC NEWS, Nov. 27, 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/asia-pacific/8382118.stm (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
44 Id.
45 Khmer Rouge Prison Chief Duch found Guilty, BBC NEWS, July 26, 2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-asia-pacific-10757320 (last visited on Oct. 20, 2010).
46 Case 001, supra note 24, at 393. 
47 Id. at 155 (noting that detainees were forced to confess to conspiratorial allegiances with the Central Intelligence
Agency, KGB, or Vietnamese Communist Party- entities of which many detainees had never heard of). 
48 Id. at 176 (recounting Duch’s confession that “[i]f the prisoners did not give satisfactory confessions, then I would
annotate on the confessions that they had to use more torture in order to get the confessions, and I was the one to
decide to order the interrogators to torture more”).
49 Id. at 241.
urine.50 The torture included psychological abuse, with detainees forced to pay homage
to images of dogs, which “in the Cambodian cultural context . . . caused victims extreme
humiliation and severe emotional distress.”51 Further, Duch personally ordered that
certain detainees be subjected to medical experiments between their interrogation and
their deaths at the Killing Fields.52 Despite his admitted awareness that “much of the
information [offered] in the confessions”elicited from such brutal interrogation
techniques ‘was fabricated,’53 Duch sanctioned these atrocities under the circular logic
of “justify[ing] the decision to arrest the [confessing] detainee”in the first place.54
Moreover, detainees were forced to reveal an imagined “network of traitors ... in the[ir]
confession”who were then “investigated and eventually arrested,”55 thus implicating
the detainees themselves in perpetuating the disparaging horror of S-21.
For the abovementioned crimes, which the Court deemed “crimes against
humanity”and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,56 the Trial Chamber
of the ECCC sentenced Duch to thirty-five years in prison. However, he would be
required to serve only nineteen years as his conviction was reduced by sixteen years,
which are 5 years for being held in illegal military detention from 1999 to 2007 and
eleven years for time already served behind bars.57 If the Trial Chamber’s sentence is
upheld on appeal,58 Duch, if alive, will walk free in 2029 at the age of eighty-six which
200 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50 Id. at 242-244, 249-250. 
51 Id. at 243.
52 Id. at 182, 275.
53 Id. at 179.
54 Id. at 254.
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 567. In particular, the ECCC found Duch guilty of “the following offences as “crimes against humanity”:
murder, extermination, enslavement, imprisonment, torture, persecution on political grounds, and other inhumane
acts”and “the following grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949: wilful killing, torture and inhumane
treatment, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or
civilian of the rights of a fair and regular trial, and unlawful confinement of a civilian.”Id. He was, however, not
convicted for the charges of torture and murder brought against him under the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code in the
absence of necessary supermajority. The International Judges argued that the statute of limitations had expired
whilst the Cambodian Judges maintained that this limitation period should only begin from 1993 since Cambodia did
not have a functioning judiciary that could have prosecuted Duch for the crimes of torture and murder before then
(1993). Trial Chamber, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Decision on the Defence Preliminary
Objection Concerning the Statute of Limitations of Domestic Crimes, July 26, 2010, available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/637/20100726_Preliminary_Objection_Case_001_ENG_PUBLIC.pdf
(last visited on Nov. 10, 2010).
57 Case 001, supra note 24, at 631-633.
58 The prosecution filed an appeal against the judgment with the Supreme Court Chamber of the ECCC seeking a
revised sentence of life imprisonment, with a reduction to 45 years in recognition of the violation of his rights (the
unlawful detention by the Cambodian Military Court) and what they consider to have been minimal cooperation with
the court. Open Society Justice Initiative, Recent Developments at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (Dec. 2010), available at  http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/
essentially means that he will spend less than the same number of days in prison as the
number of persons killed in the Tuol Sleng Prison S-21.59
a) The Trial Chamber’s reasoning for the Sentence Imposed against Duch
The Trial Chamber’s deliberation of sentencing in Case 001 is brief, indecisive and
unsatisfactory. It devoted merely eighteen (18) of its two hundred and eighty one (281)
page opinion, discussing the appropriate punishment for Duch’s crimes, even though
the factual and legal issues with which it dealt were relatively straightforward given
that Duch acknowledged his legal and moral responsibilities for the crimes committed
at Tuol Sleng Prison.60 The Court considered only four aggravating circumstances: (1)
Duch’s “abuse of power;”(2) his ‘cruelty;’(3) his ‘discriminatory intent;’and (4) “the
defencelessness of the victims.”It also balanced them against five mitigating
circumstances: (1) his “cooperation with the ECCC”which facilitated the proceedings
before the Chamber and “assisted ... national reconciliation;”(2) his “expressions of
remorse;”(3) his propensity for rehabilitation; (4) his admission of responsibility; and (5)
the “‘coercive environment’61 .... in which he functioned.”62 The court then jumped to
the conclusion that Duch deserved “full credit for the entirety of his [pre-trial] detention
and an additional sentencing credit for the period which was unlawful and in violation
his rights to a trial within reasonable time,”63 somehow settling on a sentence of
nineteen years without any additional discussion. Whereas the upper limit of
sentencing (life imprisonment) itself is still a grossly inadequate punishment for Duch’s
horrific crimes,64 discounts on sentencing have exposed the appalling disproportionality
between Duch’s crimes and his sentence. Even if the Court had actually followed in
practice65 the international precedent, established in Prosecutor v. Aleksovski,66 which
Ⅳ 	
  201
articles_publications/publications/cambodia-report-20101207/cambodia-khmer-rouge-report-20101207.pdf (last visited
on Dec. 15, 2010). 
59 Duch will spend only 6,935 (19 x 365)  days in prison for the 16,000 people killed in the Tuol Sleng Prison. Robin
McDowell, For Most Cambodians, ‘Justice’has Little Meaning, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 8, 2010, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=11353172 (last visited on Dec. 15, 2010).
60 Case 001, supra note 24, at 47 & 570.
61 The Court appeared to reject Duch’s arguments that duress and superior orders be considered further mitigating
factors, yet then curiously introduced the issue of Duch’s ‘coercive environment’when laying down its sentence. Id.
at 629.
62 Case 001, supra note 24, at 601, 609-611, 629.
63 Id. at 624. See also id. at 623-627. 
64 Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, 1146 (Sept. 27, 2006) (noting that, given the gravity of the
crimes facing international tribunals, “a sentence, however harsh, will never be able to rectify the wrongs”
committed by guilty defendants).
65 The Court claimed that it had followed this precedent. Case 001, supra note 24, at 582.
66 Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment (Mar. 24, 2000).
states that “the gravity of the crime committed is ‘the litmus test for the appropriate
sentence,’”67 life in prison should have been the lenient baseline for a proportionality
calculation. Article 39 of the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia indeed empowers the Court to sentence any person guilty of
“crimes against humanity”68 and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,69
to life imprisonment.
Therefore, in the absence of any clarification as to how the Court arrived at the initial
thirty-five year sentence, it seems that the Trial Chamber subconsciously ‘anchored’at
the forty years sentence requested by the prosecution and the thirty years maximum
sentence under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court70 and then
adjusted inward to arrive at the thirty-five year sentence. 
b) Reaction of the Victims and Public to the Judgment
Obviously, it is the infliction of maximum possible punishment that gratifies the feeling
of the victims of outrageous crimes. As such, the maximum sentences delivered by
hybrid tribunals such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone71 in high profile cases like
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (RUF Case)72 were met with positive reactions
from the victims of the decade-long civil war.73 The punishment handed down to Duch
by the ECCC, however, could not at all satisfy the surviving victims of his torture.
Chum Mey, one of the three living survivors of the Tuol Sleng Prison, left the court in
disgust on hearing the sentence.74 Public reaction was also sharp and startling,
channelling disbelief and dismay with elegantly simple retributive logic: “People lost ...
their wives, their husbands, their sons and daughters ... they are dead now.”A
Cambodian woman recalled, “so why should [Duch] be able to get out in 19 years and
spend time with his grandchildren?”75 Furthermore, a brutal killer like Duch, who is
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71 The Special Court for Sierra Leone was set up in 2002 jointly by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United
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72 Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Sentencing Judgment (Apr. 8, 2009). In this case, former Revolutionary United Front
(“RUF”) ‘interim leader’Issa Hassan Sesay was sentenced by the Court to 52 years in prison for war crimes and
“crimes against humanity.”Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Sentencing Judgment (Apr. 8, 2009).
73 S Leone trio guilty of war crimes, BBC NEWS, Feb. 25, 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
7910841.stm (last visited on April 3, 2011). 
74 BBC News, supra note 45.
75 Seth Mydans, Prison Term for Khmer Rouge Jailer Leaves Many Dissatisfied, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010; Kuong Ly,
Justice Denied for Cambodians, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/
responsible for the death of 16,000 people, has been sentenced by the ECCC to only
nineteen years in prison while low-level drug dealers in Cambodia are sentenced to life
imprisonment. 76
Supporters of the ECCC, however, expressed their satisfaction over the reality that,
after three decades, a prominent member of the Khmer Rouge had at last been brought
to justice. Youk Chhang, Director of the Documentation Centre of the Cambodia, urged
the Cambodians to look beyond the lenience of Duch’s sentence and ponder on Case
001’s broader, abstract significance. He said, 
The ECCC could sentence [Duch] to more than 14, 000 years ... and even that
wouldn’t make it fair .... By recognising the illegality of Duch’s pre-trial detention
and reducing his sentence accordingly, the verdict ... provides ... a model for fair
trials in Cambodia. [Further, it offers] official accountability. This is the most
important Court legacy: a final judgment recognising the crimes committed by the
Khmer Rouge.77
B. Trial of Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Khieu
Samphan [Case 002]
1. Case Summaries
From September 19 to November 19, 2007, the following four Khmer Rouge leaders
were detained by the ECCC.
Nuon Chea
On September 19, 2007, Nuon Chea, the chief political ideologist of the Khmer Rouge
and right-hand man of the Khmer Rouge founder Pol Pot, was arrested and put in
the custody of the Tribunal.78 Commonly known as “Brother Number Two,”Nuon
Chea was second in command to Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge,79 and, as
such, was the highest ranking official detained. Although he is quoted in an
interview with the Associated Press in September 2007 as being ready to face the
tribunal, he has consistently denied any wrongdoing. In the interview he claimed, “I
was President of the National Assembly and had nothing to do with the operation of
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76 McDowell, supra note 59.
77 Documentation Centre of Cambodia, The Duch Verdict: Khmer Roug Tribunal Case 001 (2010), available at
www.dccam.org/Archives/Photographs/Exhibition_Khmer_RougeTribunal_Case_001--The_Duch_%27s_Verdict.pdf.
(last visited on Dec. 13, 2010).
78 Case of Nuon Chea, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Provisional Detention Order (Sept. 19, 2007).
79 BBC News, supra note 22.
the government.”He also claimed, “[s]ometimes I didn't know what they were doing
because I was in the Assembly.”80
Ieng Sary
Former Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary, also known as
“Brother Number Three,”was the third person to be detained by the Tribunal on
November 14, 2007.81 As the Foreign Minister of the Khmer Rouge Regime, he was
often the only point of contact between the regime concerned and the outside
world.82 He was responsible for convincing many educated Cambodians who had
fled the Khmer Rouge to return to help rebuild the country.83 Many of those who
returned were then tortured and executed as a part of the purge of intellectuals.84
Ieng Thirith
Ieng Thirith, wife of Ieng Sary, was one of the Khmer Rouge’s founding members
and the most powerful woman.85 She was the regime’s Minister for Social Affairs.86
Her sister was married to the regime’s leader, Pol Pot.87 Prosecutors believe that she
knew about tens of thousands of people dying from starvation and disease on brutal
collective farms, but did nothing to stop the disaster.88
Khieu Samphan
Khieu Samphan, the Khmer Rouge’s former official Head of the State, was the fifth
leader to be arrested on November 19, 2007 in Phnom Penh when he left the hospital
where he had been treated for a stroke suffered on November 13, 2007.89 He was the
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788f6365e&phpMyAdmin=ou7lpwtyV9avP1XmRZP6FzDQzg3&phpMyAdmin=KZTGHmT45FRCAiEg7OLlzXFdNJ4
(last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
81 Case of Ieng Sary, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Provisional Detention Order (Nov. 14, 2007).
82 BBC News, supra note 22.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. 
86 Jared Ferrie, Tribunal Charges Khmer Rouge ‘First Lady’with Genocide, REUTERS, Dec. 21, 2009, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5BK17H20091221 (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
87 BBC News, supra note 22.
88 Id.
89 Case of Khieu Samphan, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Provisional Detention Order (Nov. 19, 2007);
Sopheng Cheang, Ex-Khmer Rouge Head of State Arrested, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 19, 2007, available at
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/CTM/AP%2011-19-07.pdf?phpMyAdmin=8319ad34ce0db941ff04d8c788f6365e&
phpMyAdmin=ou7lpwtyV9avP1XmRZP6FzDQzg3&phpMyAdmin=KZTGHmT45FRCAiEg7OLlzXFdNJ4 (last visited on
Mar. 10, 2010).
public face of the Khmer Rouge.90 According to the Prosecutors, Khieu Samphan
aided and abetted the policies of the Khmer Rouge, which were “characterised by
murder, extermination, imprisonment, persecution on political grounds and other
inhumane acts.”91 Although he has never denied these deaths, he and his lawyers
insist that, as Head of the State, he was never directly involved in the acts alleged.92
2. The Result of the Investigation 
Although the investigations against the four senior-most living members of the Khmer
Rouge regime, i.e. Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Khieu Samphan, began in
July 2007, it was completed only (after more than 3 years) on September 15, 2010, when
the Co-Investigating Judges of the ECCC entered the 739 page closing order indicting all
of the four. The Investigating Judges in the closing order charged the four with the
following grounds: (a) “crimes against humanity;93 (b) Genocide;94 (c) Grave breaches of
the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949;95 (d) Violations of the 1956 Cambodian
Penal Code;96 and (e) Joint Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”) as a mode of liability.97
It goes without saying that, the ECCC was fortunate that its first trial involved an
accused who was as cooperative and articulate as Duch. The cooperation of Duch and
his counsel made it much easier for the prosecution, which has the burden of proving
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8419789.stm (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
93 Closing Order, Case File 002, Sept. 15, 2010, para. 1613, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/
courtDoc/740/D427Eng.pdf (last visited on Dec. 15, 2010). In particular, the ECCC charged the four with the
following offences as “crimes against humanity”: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment,
torture, rape, persecution on political, racial and religious grounds and other inhuman acts.
94 Id. Specifically, the ECCC accused the four with the offence of killing members of the groups of Vietnamese and
Cham.  
95 Id. In particular, the ECCC indicted the four with the following grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949:
wilful killing, torture or inhumane treatment, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or civilian the rights of fair and regular trial and unlawful deportation or
unlawful confinement of civilian.
96 Id. Specifically the Court the termed the following crimes as violations of the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code: homicide,
torture and religious persecution. 
97 Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Order on the Application
at the ECCC of the Form of Liability Known as Joint Criminal Enterprise, December 8, 2009, No. D97/13. Joint
Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”) eliminates the need to show that the accused physically perpetrated the crime in order
to hold him/her individually responsible. There are three forms of JCE; the first is when a group shares a common
intent to commit a crimes, the second is when actions are taken in “a common concerted system of ill-treatment,”
and the third, and most broad, covers crimes that were the foreseeable consequence of a common plan. The
applicability of JCE at the ECCC means that there is less of a burden on the prosecution to link individual
defendants to specific crimes and there can instead be a focus on proving that crimes occurred and that they
resulted from the policies of the leaders of the Khmer Rouge.
the elements of all the crimes charged,98 and the Trial Chamber, responsible for trial
management and the primary questioning of all witnesses, to clearly demonstrate the
role of Duch in relation to S-21 Prison.99 All indications are that those advantages will
not be present when the Court begins the trial of Case 002, probably by the middle of
2011,100 against the said four senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge.101 Unlike Duch, these
four defendants who held high-level positions in the Khmer Rouge have denied
complicity in war crimes and refused to apologise.102 Theng Sary, a survivor of the
Khmer Rouge regime who is now a human rights lawyer in Phnom Penh, is of the
opinion that Case 002 will make Duch’s case look like a ‘cake walk.’103 Therefore, it
appears that this trial will present the prosecution and the court with extremely
formidable challenges in presenting evidence of the complex charges which include
genocide and liability based on a joint criminal enterprise, and in telling a
comprehensible story of the senior leadership of the Khmer Rouge.
III. Elements Presently Undermining the 
Credibility of the ECCC
The credibility of the ECCC has seriously been undermined by the failure of the
Tribunal and its stakeholders to effectively address the factors of: (1) political
interference in the judicial process; (2) failure to address the allegations of corruption by
not implementing a credible anticorruption programme; and (3) deliberate strategies to
stall the legal process.
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20101110.pdf (last visited on Dec. 5. 2010); Khmer Rouge leaders indicted by Cambodian genocide tribunal, GUARDIAN
(UK), Sept. 16, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/16/khmer-rouge-leaders-indicted (last
visited on Dec. 5, 2010).
101 Id.
102 Shay, supra note 38.
103 Id.
A. Political Interference in the Judicial Process 
Independence of judiciary is sine qua non for a democratic society proclaiming the rule of
law. The most traditional and central meaning of the independence of judiciary is that
the judges are in a position to arrive at their decisions free from interference of the
political branches, especially the executive, and from apprehension for suffering
personally as a result of exercising judicial powers.104 This noble concept, however, has
not found its favour in Cambodia, where the political structure is characterised by a
corrupt executive with a long history of interfering with its weak judiciary.105 High
political officials instruct Cambodian judges to rule in a certain way especially in cases
involving political issues and threaten their safety if they do not rule as instructed.106
Since 1993, physical attacks on judges have frequently occurred. In April 2003,
moreover, a prominent judge was assassinated in the middle of the day as he drove to
work in Phnom Penh.107 In highly politicised cases, it is not uncommon for the
executive to negotiate prearranged pardons to demonstrate its power over the
judiciary.108
Taking into account the abovementioned realities, the UN Secretary General Mr.
Kofi Annan on March 31, 2003 opined in his report to the General Assembly that both
Chambers of the ECCC should be composed of a majority of international judges.109
The United Nations Group of Experts also advocated for a predominantly international
tribunal due to the long history of political interference on the Cambodian judicial
system.110 However, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen dismissed these conclusions.
Hun Sen even counter-proposed the creation of a joint tribunal with Cambodian
personnel in majority,111 which ultimately saw the light of the day. Many critics
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108 Amnesty International, Kingdom of Cambodia, Amnesty International’s Position and Concerns Regarding the
Proposed ‘Khmer Rouge’Tribunal, ASA 23/005/2003 (2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/3f12fb834.html (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010)
109 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on Khmer Rouge Trials, U.N. Doc. A/57/769, 11 (Mar. 31,
2003).
110 Scott Luftglass, Crossroads in Cambodia: The United Nation’s Responsibility to Withdraw Involvement from the
Establishment of a Cambodian Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge, 90 VA. L. REV. 893, 909 (2004).
111 Id. at 911-912. 
lambasted Hun Sen’s insistence on the establishment of a joint tribunal that was
fundamentally domestic in character as a ploy to dictate the proceedings112 of the court.
This move by Hun Sen to establish a Tribunal that was composed mostly of Cambodian
personnel thus cast serious doubts over his sincerity, as manifested in his letter on 21
June 1997 addressed to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan,113 to bring to justice those
Khmer Rouge leaders, responsible for war crimes, “crimes against humanity”and
genocide from 1975-1979. Judging by the recent appointment of judges with
questionable backgrounds, refusal by 6 witnesses holding government positions in
Cambodia to honour summons to give testimony before the investigating judges in
Case 002, and rejection by the Investigating Judges of the request to call Prime Minister
Hun Sen and other key government figures, one would obviously agree that the
criticisms were indeed well founded. 
1. Appointment of Judges with Questionable Backgrounds to Influence the
Proceedings of the ECCC   
The Cambodian Judges of the Tribunal, as pointed out earlier, are appointed by the
Cambodian Government without the requirement of any scrutiny by the UN. This
unfettered power rendered the Hun Sen government to appoint judges freely - many of
whom received their law degrees in the former Soviet Communist bloc, such as East
Germany, Russia, Kazakhstan and Vietnam, where carrying out the state’s wishes
perhaps counted for more than maintaining the appearance of impartiality114 - closely
associated with Hun Sen’s political party. Among these judges, the appointments of (1)
Ney Thol (President of the Military Court and also a member of the Central Committee
of Hun Sen’s ruling CPP, who presided over two major trials where Hun Sen’s political
opponents were convicted of national security related crimes)115 to the Pre-Trial
Chamber, (2) Thou Mony (who ruled twice against the supposed killers of Chea Vichea,
a trade unionist who was allegedly assassinated on the orders of ‘someone’in the
Cambodian Government,116 and once overturned a lower court’s guilty ruling against
Hun Sen’s nephew, who had been involved in a shooting spree in 2003 in which two
people were killed and two other wounded)117 to the Trial Chamber, and (3) Nil Non
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113 See Letter from Norodom Ranariddh, Cambodian First Prime Minister, and Hun Sen, Cambodian Second Prime
Minister, to Secretary General Annan (June 21, 1997).
114 Son & Niemann, supra note 9, at 109.
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116 Amnesty International, Kingdom of Cambodia: The Killing of Trade Unionist Chea Vichea, ASA 23/008/2004 (2004).
117 Munthit K, Cambodia Judges Credibility Questioned, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 22, 2006, available at
(who himself confessed of taking bribes from parties in court cases he judged) to the
Trial Chamber as its President,118 bear testimony of the evil design of manipulating the
trial process by the Regime. Moreover, it is worth mentioning here that, two of the
aforesaid three controversial judges, i.e. Thou Mony and Nil Non (as the President),
both of whom sit in the Trial Chamber, may have played a major role in ‘anchoring’the
lenient verdict against Duch in Case 001 in deference to the dictates of the hierarchy of
the Cambodian Government which is quite consistent with their past notorious
reputation of being unduly influenced by their political supervisor.
2. Refusal of Six Witnesses Holding Government Positions to Honour Summons 
The apprehensions of political interference were heightened when six high government
officials refused to honour summons to give testimony before the investigating judges
in Case 002119 and Prime Minister Hun Sen himself publicly encouraged this refusal.
Hun Sen even went so far as saying that if the foreign officials involved in the tribunal
are not satisfied with the refusal of government officials to testify before them, then they
“can pack up their clothes and return home.”120 This statement made by the Prime
Minister reflects the total disregard of his Government’s direct obligation under Article
25 of the Agreement (concluded between the Royal Government of Cambodia and the
UN) to assist the investigating judges in actions, including the “service of documents.”121
3. Rejection by the Investigating Judges of the Request to Call Hun Sen and
Other Senior Government Officials  
On March 1, 2010, Investigating Judges, Marcel Lemonde and You Bunleng, declined to
comply with the request of the defence teams of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan to call
Prime Minister Hun Sen to testify along with Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, Finance
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119 Press Release of ECCC, A Number of Case File Documents in Case 002 Published (Oct. 7, 2009), available at
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121 See The Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the
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Doc A/RES/57/228B (June 6, 2003).
Minister Keat Chhon and other senior government leaders.122 Judge You Bungleng
reasoned that these senior officials were not likely to provide any additional evidence
and, as such, there was no justification of interviewing them.123
4. Interference in the Investigation of Additional Suspects
Apprehensions of political interference in the investigation work of the ECCC were
escalated in December 2008 when the Cambodian Co-Prosecutor, Chea Leang, would
not agree with the International Co-Prosecutor at that time Robert Petit to the
investigation of five additional suspects beyond the five named defendants.124 The
reasons she provided to justify her position had nothing to do with the sufficiency of the
evidence or the legal basis for additional investigations, but were political in nature and
aligned with the long- held views of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen who has long
wanted to limit the trials to his political enemies and who resisted efforts which brought
people in positions of power (or whose patrons) before the court.125
However, in August 2009, nine months after the International Prosecutor’s filing of
disagreement notice concerning the submission of the names of five additional suspects
for judicial investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued a divided ruling that allowed the
submission to go forward.126 Following the public announcement of this decision, the
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen bluntly stated his objection to bring charges
against any additional accused, implying that it would result in social unrest that may
kill 200,000 to 300, 000 people.127 On October 27, 2010, Hun Sen overtly told the UN
Secretary General Mr. BAN Ki-moon during a meeting in Phnom Penh that: “Cases
003/004 will not be allowed ... The Court will try the four senior leaders successfully
and then finish with Case 002.”128 These statements of the Prime Minister crystallize the
concern about the future of the Case 003/004, as it is alleged that the Cambodian
members of the Staff at the ECCC are now being forced to adhere to Hun Sen’s political
direction by refusing to cooperate and participate in the investigation of the five
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additional suspects in Cases 003/004.129
The independence of the ECCC has been severely undermined, as it is the hierarchy
of the Cambodian Government, and not the Judges of the ECCC, who are deciding
whom to charge, what to charge and who should testify. This direct interference in the
investigation is a clear violation of the Cambodian Government’s commitments under
the provisions laid down in Articles 5(3), 12(2) and 13(1) of the Agreement.130 The
Government has instructed or encouraged officials concerned to disregard court orders
and refuse to undertake investigations in contravention, not only of the
abovementioned three provisions of the Agreement, but also of the provisions of the
UN Basic Principles on the Independence of Judiciary, 1985 which in Articles 1 and 4
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expressly state that: 
The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State .... It is the duty of
all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of
the judiciary.131
There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial
process.132
B. Failure to Address the Allegations of Corruption by Not
Implementing a Credible Anticorruption Programme
Corruption within the ECCC is such a severe problem133 that requires the UN and other
major stakeholders to take effective measures so as to ensure that their money is well
spent. The complaints of corruption at the ECCC were first brought to the notice of the
UN by the Cambodian staffs134 when they claimed that they had to give money in
exchange for their jobs.135 These complaints were followed by a call from the Open
Society Justice Initiative, a watchdog NGO, trying to set up an independent
investigation mechanism for accusations of corruption.136 Ultimately, on February 23,
2008, a high-level UN delegation met the Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Sok An,
and issued a joint statement to the effect that an agreement has been reached involving
continuing parallel domestic and international mechanisms to investigate corruption.137
However, this statement was ambiguous and unclear as to the specifics of the said
mechanisms and, as such, smacked of political compromise.
After about a year of negotiations, on August 11, 2009, the Government of Cambodia
and the UN signed the Agreement to Establish an Independent Counsellor at the
Extraordinary Chambers for the Courts in Cambodia.138 This Agreement provided the
skeletal outline of an anticorruption program that might, if properly developed, be a
step toward both ensuring that ECCC staff have a safe and effective remedy if they are
aware of or subjected to corrupt practices. Thus, it might also set to secure the credibility
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131 U.N. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary art. 1 (1985).
132 Id. art. 4.
133 Son & Niemann, supra note 9, at 111.
134 The names of these Cambodian staffs, however, were never disclosed in any document.
135 Hall, supra note 124.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Press Release, Joint Statement on Establishment of Independent Counsellor at Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia, U.N. Doc. L/3146 (Aug. 12, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2009/
l3146.doc.htm (last visited on Jan. 21, 2010).  
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of the Court impaired by almost three years of inadequate addressing of corruption
allegations. In recent, however, significant concerns have been expressed about the
independence of the ‘Independent Counsellor’charged with running the programme
because of his role as the head of the Cambodia National Audit Authority, a body that
should have been independent of the Cambodian Government in theory.139
Since the announcement of the plan on August 11, 2009, the Independent Counsellor
has visited the Court and held a single press conference. There, he promised to be
accessible to all staff.140 He expressed the intention to collect information relating to all
corruption and other complaints from court staffs, and would be involved in resolving
those deemed to be ‘well-founded.’141 These limited promises appear to be empty as
no significant action has been taken by him thus far, i.e. he has not yet revealed publicly,
or to the staff of the ECCC, what procedures are in place to ensure protection and
anonymity for whistleblowers, how to contact him, the nature and limit of his power to
investigate charges, and other critical elements that are a prerequisite to an effective
programme.142
In a statement at the end of March 2010, the Cambodia National Authority
announced that the Independent Counsellor had begun investigations into three
received complaints, of which two were from Cambodian staff and one from a UN staff
member. It was also announced by the Independent Counsellor’s office that a public
report of his work would be available in July 2010.143 Contrary to this announcement,
the Independent Counsellor declared on October 18, 2010 that he would not publish a
report summarising the activities of his office in pursuance of UN’s instructions.144 The
non-publication of the Report of the Independent Counsellor calls into question the
openness and transparency of the entire anticorruption process at the ECCC. 
139 Robbie Corey-Boulet, Corruption Counsel’s Role at ECCC Unclear, PHNOM PENH POST, Sept. 23, 2009, quoting
expressions of concerns about the independence of the appointed independent counselor: “Sophal Ear, a professor at
the US Naval Postgraduate School in California whose father died during the Khmer Rouge regime, wrote in a Wall
Street Journal oyttp-ed that the selection of Uth Chhorn in particular was troubling [because of his position as head
of the National Audit Authority (“NAA”)]. . . . he said the NAA’s lack of transparency had robbed it of all credibility,
adding: “Since the auditor general and the independent counsellor will be one and the same, this does not bode well
for the credibility of the ECCC.”The NAA, which began its work in 2002 and is tasked with auditing all government
bodies, is officially independent under the Law on Audit. However, a 2008 review by the nonprofit Global Integrity
stated: The NAA is believed to not be politically independent, even by law. See Sophal Ear, Opinion: Cambodian
‘Justice’Without Major Personnel Changes, the Khmer Rouge Trial Risks Descending into Farce, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 1, 2009. 
140 Society Justice Initiative, supra note 18.
141 Robbie Corey-Boulet, ECCC Official to Collect Evidence, PHNOM PENH POST, Sept. 24, 2009. 
142 Open Society Justice Initiative, supra note 18.
143 Vong Sokheng, KRT Graft Report Due by July, PHNOM PENH POST, June 17, 2010.
144 James O’Toole, UN Keeps Corruption Probe Confidential, PHNOM PENH POST, Oct. 18, 2010.
The non-strengthening of the anticorruption mechanism at the ECCC, which results
from lack of determination on the part of key stakeholders, severely undermines the
Court’s credibility. As one observer noted, “... corruption is one key issue that simply
can’t be ignored. The ECCC cannot make survivors of Democratic Kampuchea whole
for the abuses they suffered. What it can do is deliver ... credible verdicts and the
promise of a judicial system that will better protect ... Cambodians’rights in the future.”145
It is believed that, the UN, the donors, and the Cambodian Government show their
seriousness towards the adoption of a resolution concerning anticorruption mechanism
only when critical funding is needed for the court. Once the immediate pressure for
funding is off, discussions and progress regarding the matter come to an end. Because
of this kind of ‘window dressing,’the court and the UN will have difficulty in
convincing court staff and Cambodians whether they have any sincere plan to solve the
corruption problems faced by the Court.146
C. Deliberate Strategies to Stall the Legal Process  
Manifestly, the Cambodians prolonged the process of establishing the ECCC in a
calculated and planned manner so that a certain number of most notorious Khmer
Rouge leaders including Pol Pot, the man most wanted for “crimes against humanity,”
Son Sen, Defense Minister and responsible for the Santebal, the Political Police, Yun Yat,
Minister, Thiounn Thioeunn, Minister, Ta Mok ‘the Butcher,’the Regime’s Chief of
Military Command and one of Pol Pot’s most ruthless henchmen, and his deputy Ke
Pauk, having died in the interim, could never brought to justice.147 
The trial of Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thrith, and Khieu Samphan, as mentioned
earlier, is not expected to commence before mid-2011.148 This inordinate delay in trying
these aging (most of them also in ill health149) atrocity lords may also be deliberately
planned so that some or all of the defendants involved in this case may not be alive to
face the tribunal.150 In this context, the views of Vanna Chan, daughter of a Cambodian
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145 John D. Ciorciari, Justice and Judicial Corruption (Commentary), SEARCHING FOR THE TRUTH (Magazine of the
Documentation Center of Cambodia), available at http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/CTM/Ciorciari%20
October%202007.pdf?phpMyAdmin=8319ad34ce0db941ff04d8c788f6365e&phpMyAdmin=ou7lpwtyV9avP1XmRZP6Fz
DQzg3&phpMyAdmin=KZTGHmT45FRCAiEg7OLlzXFdNJ4 (last visited on Nov. 10, 2010).
146 Id.
147 Trial Watch. Criminal Court for Cambodia, available at http://www.trial-ch.org/index.php?id=923&L=5 (last visited
on Mar. 12, 2010).
148 Guardian (UK), supra note 100.
149 Geoffrey Cain, Justice Comes to the Killing Fields, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV. (2009), available at
http://www.feer.com/politics/2009/FEBRUARY/Justice-Comes-to-the-Killing-Fields (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
150 Shay, supra note 38.
genocide survivor, are worthy of note that “they [Cambodian Government Officials]
may stall [the legal process] so much that all the remaining key Khmer Rouge officials
will die of old age.”151
It cannot reasonably be expected that “Hun Sen and his CPP would allow the Khmer
Rouge Trial to be completed soon and according to international standard of justice,”152
when all the high-profile crimes including the politically motivated ‘Grenade Attack’of
March 30, 1997, the murder of union activists’politicians, prominent monks, reporters
and recent forced removal of people from their land are still unresolved.153
IV. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion reveals that the establishment of the ECCC which was
designed as a national court with ‘extraordinary’international character, following an
agreement reached between the UN and Cambodia after 26 years of genocide,
demonstrates that impunity will not be successful in Cambodia for surviving senior
Khmer Rouge leaders or others most accused of the atrocity crimes of the Pol Pot regime
committed between 1975 and 1979. This establishment alone sends a powerful message
throughout the world that the international community is getting more serious about
accountability for atrocity crimes and that there is no stopwatch for justice. 
However, the progress ECCC achieved by successfully completing the trial of Kaing
Guek Eav, has, to a great extent, been tarnished by the judgment delivered by the
Tribunal in this case, and the failure of the Tribunal and its stakeholders (including the
UN) in addressing certain existing problems of profound nature like blatant and naked
political interference, corruption, and delaying tactics resorted to by the Cambodian
officials at the ECCC. To proceed with the trials, without properly addressing the
political interference and allegations of corruption, obviously risks tainting the entire
process and casting a shadow over any legal outcomes. Furthermore, such a
dispensation of justice would create an imperfect and unhealthy precedent of the UN
acquiescence to a regime seeking to profit from and control internationally-backed
tribunals. Joseph Mussomeli, the United States Ambassador to Cambodia, has aptly
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151 Rolfsmeier L, Minnesota’s Cambodian Immigrants Remember Genocide and Wait for Justice, MINN. POST, Apr. 2,
2008.
152 Tith N, For Whom the bells Tolls: Unresolved Murders under Hun Sen’s Dictatorship, Comment under No. 15,
available at http://www.cambodiana.org/default.aspx (last visited on Mar. 11, 2010). 
153 Son & Niemann, supra note 9, at 112.
said, “the only thing worse than no trial is a trial that is a farce.”154 It should be kept in
mind that, if the ECCC does not adjudicate the cases brought before it in a free,
impartial and independent manner, justice to be administered by it would be a
meaningless word. As Viscount Bryce said, “.... if the law be dishonestly administered,
the salt has lost its savour; if it be weakly or fitfully enforced, the guarantees or order fail
... If the lamp of justice goes out in darkness, how great is that darkness!”155 What
matters most is the upholding of the public and international community’s perception
of the independence and impartiality of the judges, which is well reflected in the oft-
quoted maxim that: “Justice must not only be done, but must also be seen to be done.”
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154 Faiola A, Victims of Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge Fear Derailment of Trials, WASH. POST, Feb. 2 2007.
155 JAMES BRYCE, II  MODERN DEMOCRACIES 384 (1921).
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This article examines the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
established to try those responsible for the atrocities perpetrated against the
Cambodian people by the former Khmer Rouge Regime (1975-1979). It focuses on the
trial of the first case conducted by the ECCC which resulted in the ‘lenient’
judgment. The paper then outlines in details the factors such as political interference,
corrupt practices and inordinate delay of the legal process which are undermining the
ECCC’s credibility to administer fair justice to the victims of genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes. Finally, it stresses on the fact that the failure of the ECCC
and its stakeholders to duly address these fundamental issues would end in the
farcical dispensation of justice.
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I. Introduction
The ‘Ultra-Maoist’Khmer Rouge, which came to power in Cambodia in 1975 and
deposed by the Vietnamese troops after nearly 4 years of its reign in 1979, annihilated
1.7 million people in the ‘killing fields’- about a quarter of Cambodia’s population at
that time.1 In order to do justice to the victims of the mass atrocities of the Khmer Rouge
regime, and to achieve the wider objective of preventing the perpetration of such mass
atrocities in the future, the United Nations assisted the Cambodian government to
establish the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”), a hybrid
tribunal.2 It became fully functional in June 2007 after lengthy and troublesome
negotiations,3 to bring to trial ‘senior’and “most responsible leaders”of the Khmer
Rouge4 accused of committing genocide,5 war crimes,6“crimes against humanity,”7 and
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1 The communist Khmer Rouge under the leadership of Pol Pot backed by China opposed the Government led by
popular leader Norodom Sihanouk. It gained support after Sihanouk was toppled by Lon Nol (1970) having the
support and blessings of the United States. In between the two forces, a new force of communist Vietnamese fighters
emerged and sought refuge in the neutral territory that was Cambodia at that time. Ultimately, secret US bombings,
which allegedly caused more than 150,000 casualties, probably paved the way for Pol Pot, the leader of communist
Khmer Rouge, and his troops to take up power. On April 17, 1975, Pol Pot’s troops marched into Phnom Penh. Their
proclamation of ‘Year Zero’opened up an era of terror and horror. In one single week, the 2.5 million citizens from
Phnom Penh were forced out to the countryside. The Ultra-Maoist Khmers mercilessly held to the maxim: “Keeping
you is no benefit, losing you is no loss.”The regime launched a revolution in which all pre-existing economic, social
and cultural institutions were destroyed, all foreign influences were wiped out and the entire population was
transformed into a collective work force. The Khmer Rouge set out to kill anyone who could possibly thwart its goal of
creating a new society, including those among its own ranks whom were viewed as potential dissidents. It perceived
‘intellectuals’such as doctors, teachers, lawyers, students and those capable of speaking a foreign language as
particularly threatening a the mere fact of appearing to be intellectual by wearing spectacles was sufficient reason to
be condemned to death. An unknown number of persons were thrown into slavery, arbitrarily executed, or died of
starvation, disease or exhaustion in labour camps. In the space of 4 years, the Khmer Rouge genocide extinguished
1.7 million people in the ‘killing fields,’or about a quarter of Cambodia’s population at that time. For further
information, see II BRITANNICA READY REFERENCE ENCYCLOPAEDIA 134 (2007); Wendy Lambourne, The Khmer Rouge
Tribunal: Justice for Genocide in Cambodia? 3-4 (Law and Society Association and New Zealand (“LSAANZ”)
Conference, University of Sydney, Working Paper, Dec. 10-12, 2008), available at http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/
2123/4042/1/LSAANZ%20Lambourne%20Cambodia%20conf%20paper%20final.pdf  (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010);
Trial Watch, Criminal Court for Cambodia, available at http://www.trial-ch.org/index.php?id=923&L=5 (last visited
on Mar. 12, 2010). The Secretary-General, Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to
General Assembly Resoluation 52/135, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 110(b), U.N. Doc. A/53/850, at 9 & 13 (March 16,
1999); Theresa Klosterman, The Feasibility and Propriety of a Truth Commission in Cambodia: Too Little? Too
Late?, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 803, 849 (1998); and Rachel S. Taylor, Better Late Than Never, in INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW SERIES, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 237,
239 & 240 (Jane E. Stromseth ed., 2003). 
2 Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 295 (2003).
3 For a comprehensive overview of the ECCC, see John D. Ciorciari, History and Politics behind the Khmer Rouge
Trials, in ON TRIAL: THE KHMER ROUGE ACCOUNTABILITY PROCESS 33 (John D. Ciorciari & Anne Heindel eds., 2009). 
4 The Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers arts. 1 & 2, NS/RKM/1004/006 (2004).
5 Id. art. 4. 
other crimes under the Cambodian Penal Law8 during the period of April 17, 1975 to
January 6, 1979. Thus, those who assisted the Khmer Rouge in coming to power and
supported them after they were overthrown by the Vietnamese have been kept out of
the jurisdiction of the ECCC. Moreover, since trials have been limited to the senior
leaders of the Khmer Rouge Regime and those who were most responsible for the
crimes and serious violations, many of the lower perpetrators but responsible for
serious crimes would escape punishment, thereby adding to the “sense of impunity”
that has been prevailing in Cambodia for the last 30 years.9
The original plan of the Group of Experts,10 as envisioned in their Report to the
General Assembly and the Security Council in 1999,11 was a relatively simple two-tier
structure having a trial chamber and an appeal chamber. In the end, however, it was
settled upon a complicated three-tier structure encompassing a Pre-Trial Chamber, a
Trial Chamber and a Supreme Court Chamber.12 
The ECCC has a total of seventeen judges presiding in the abovementioned three
chambers. Both the Pre-Trial Chamber, which settles disagreements between the Co-
Prosecutors and Co-Investigating Judges, and the Trial Court Chamber are consisted of
three Cambodian and two international judges. Decisions delivered by these Chambers
require an ‘absolute majority,’that is, four of the five judges must agree in order to pass
a judgment. Similarly, the Supreme Court Chamber consists of four Cambodian and
three international judges, with decisions requiring the agreement of five judges.13 It is
Ⅳ 	
  195
6 Id. art. 6. 
7 Id. art. 5.
8 Id. art. 8. 
9 Christina Son & Grant Niemann, Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers: A Mixed Tribunal Destined to Fail, 33 CRIM.
L. J. 105, 107 (2009).
10 In pursuance of paragraph 16 of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution entitled “Situation of Human
Rights in Cambodia.”See G.A. RES. 52/135, 52nd Sess., 70th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 112(b), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/52/135 (Dec. 12, 1997). The U.N. Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan established a “Group of Experts”with
three main goals: (1) to evaluate the existing evidence and determine the nature of the crimes committed [by the
Khmer Rouge leaders]; (2) to assess the feasibility of bringing Khmer Rouge leaders to justice; and (3) to explore
options for trials before international or domestic courts. See Steven R. Ratner, The United Nations Group of
Experts for Cambodia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 948-949 (1999). 
11 The Secretary-General, Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to General Assembly
Resolution 52/135, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 110(b), U.N. Doc. A/53/850 (Mar. 16, 1999). See also The Secretary-
General, Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution
52/135, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 110(b), U.N. Doc. S/1999/231 (Mar. 16, 1999).
12 Agreement to Establish an Independent Counsellor at the Extraordinary Chambers for the Courts in Cambodia, art.
3, infra note 128. See David Scheffer, The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 12 (Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2008), available at http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/CTM/
Cambodia%20Scheffer%20Abridged%20Chapter%20July%202007.pdf  (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
13 EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE KHMER ROUGE TRIALS (2008), available
at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/publications/an_introduction_to_Khmer_Rouge_Trials_3th.pdf (last
visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
evident that in each of the three chambers of the ECCC, an outcome would happen in
accordance with the desire of the Cambodian negotiators, because the majority of the
judges (3:2 except for the Supreme Court Chamber where the ratio is 4:3) are
Cambodians. This is a clear-cut departure from the original proposal of the Group of
Experts14 which envisaged that in trial chambers the majority of the judges would be
drawn from the international community, thereby ensuring impartiality and protection
from local political interference.15 Furthermore, the international judges as
recommended by the UN are ultimately appointed by the Supreme Council of the
Magistracy of Cambodia upon its satisfaction, while the national judges are internally
appointed without the scrutiny of the UN whatsoever.16 Additionally, the positions of
two investigating judges (one a Cambodian and the other a foreigner) and of two
prosecutors (one is a Cambodian and the other, a foreigner) were created at the ECCC
as a result of a compromise between the common law tradition of a strong prosecutor
and the civil law tradition of investigating judges.17
An attempt will be made in this paper to examine the trials conducted by the ECCC
critically, in particular with special reference to the judgment delivered in its first case.
Most importantly, the factors that are undermining ECCC’s ability to render credible
justice to the victims of genocide, war crimes and “crimes against humanity”in
Cambodia would be brought to the fore.
II. Trials of the Senior Leaders Charged
From July to November 2007, the ECCC detained 5 ‘senior leaders’who were ‘most
responsible’for war related crimes. The five accused persons were then implicated into
two cases: Case 001 against Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch for crimes that occurred at or in
conjunction with Tuol Sleng Prison (S-21) and Case 002 against Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary,
Ieng Thirith and Khieu Samphan for their preeminent leadership role in the Khmer
Rouge regime, which resulted in wide-spread atrocities throughout Cambodia for the
duration of the ECCC’s temporal jurisdiction.
Besides of the abovementioned 5 accused persons in custody, the international
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14 Scheffer, supra note 12, at 13.
15 Son & Niemann, supra note 9, at 106-107.
16 Suzannah Linton, Safeguarding the Independence and Impartiality of the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers, 4 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 327 (2006), available at http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/4/2/327 (last visited on Apr.
12, 2010).
17 Scheffer, supra note 12, at 13.
prosecutor submitted the names of 5 additional suspects in two separate cases [Cases
003 and 004] to the investigating judges on September 7, 2009 requesting formal judicial
investigation.18 The names of these suspects and the subject-matter of the investigation,
however, have been kept confidential19 and none of these additional suspects have yet
been formally charged or arrested.20
A. Trial of Kaing Guek Eav Alias Duch [Case 001]
1. Overview
On July 31, 2007, the Tribunal indicted its first suspect Kaing Guek Eav, also known as
‘Comrade Duch.’21 After the death of Ta Mok (The Butcher) while in custody in July
2006, Kaing Guek Eav, aged 67, is the youngest surviving member of the regime to be in
prison since 1999.22 A former math teacher, he used to be the Governor of the Tuol
Sleng Prison known as S-21, a centre of torture where he oversaw the job of extracting
confessions from prisoners of counter-revolutionary activity with fastidious attention to
detail23 and subsequently, ‘smash’24 them by striking “the base of the neck with a
metal bar,”slitting open “their throats or stomachs ... and [pushing] their bodies ... into
pits.”25 In Tuol Sleng Prison, an estimated 16,00026 inmates were tortured, enslaved and
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18 Open Society Justice Initiative, Recent Developments at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(Nov. 2009), available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/articles_publications/
publications/eccc_20091120 (last visited on Feb. 10, 2010).
19 Although the names of the accused in Cases 003/004 remain confidential, there are indications that the accused are
considered to be persons ‘most responsible’for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime (e.g. not the ‘senior
leaders’who constitute the Case 002 defendants). See Open Society Justice Initiative, Salvaging Independence: The
Need for a Principled Completion Plan for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, available at
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/articles_publications/publications/khmer-rouge-
tribunal-20101110/cambodia-khmer-rouge-20101110.pdf (last visited on Dec. 12, 2010).  
20 Id.
21 Case of Kaing Guek Eav, Case No. 001/18-07-2007, Order of Provisional Detention (July 21, 2007).
22 Khmer Rouge Leaders Facing Trial, BBC NEWS, Feb. 13, 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2856771.stm
(last visited on Mar. 5, 2010).
23 Kevin Doyle, Long-Delayed Justice in Cambodia, TIME, Nov. 21, 2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/
article/0,8599,1686601,00.html (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
24 As Duch explained to the Court, “to smash ... means to arrest secretly [to interrogate] with torture employed, and
then [to execute] secretly”without judicial process. Co-Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-
2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment, 100 (July 26, 2010).
25 Id. at 220.
26 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia officially found the number detained at S-21 to be at least
12,273. See Case 001, id. at 141-43. The actual number was ‘considerably greater.’Because of incomplete
documentary records, however, only 12,273 victims could be verified. Id. The tentative scholarly consensus is that
roughly 16,000 people perished at S-21. See Kenneth M. Quinn, Pattern and Scope of Violence, in CAMBODIA,
1975?1978: RENDEZVOUS WITH DEATH 198 (Karl D. Jackson ed., 1992).
murdered in the late 1970s,27 of whom only twelve or so are known to have survived.28
According to Vann Nath, one of the twelve survivors of the S-21, “.... Duch killed people
without consideration - whether they were elderly or children. What he did every day
during that time was slaughter.”29 Duch was accordingly charged with “crimes against
humanity,”war crimes, and torture30 and murder31 under the 1956 Cambodian Penal
Code.32
Ultimately, the trial of Duch began on February 17, 2009.33 Duch’s landmark hearing
evoked for many Cambodians attending the court a sense of wonderment that the
Khmer Rouge leadership was finally being taken into task.34 Duch’s right to adequate
legal representation, to a public trial, and to confront witnesses and have adequate time
and resources to present his defense, as specifically mandated in the Agreement
concluded between Cambodian and the UN through the incorporation of Articles 14
and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,35 were complied
with.36 As one of the goals of the ECCC is to contribute to reconciliation and an
enhanced understanding of justice in Cambodia,37 the Court needed to conduct the
Duch trial such a way that detailed factual testimony was presented and accessible to a
large number of Cambodians who were born after the Khmer Rouge regime. The lack,
until recently, of significant efforts to educate the public and particularly the younger
generation about the Khmer Rouge, has created a void in the understanding in
Cambodia about the Khmer Rouge legacy.38 A full evidentiary trial, easily accessible
through mass media to most Cambodians was necessary to meet the Court’s goals of
informing the public about the realities of the Khmer Rouge era. The Court’s efforts on
these fronts were commendable as about 28,000 people attended Duch’s trial at the
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27 Khmer Rouge Chief Stuns Court with Release Bid, BBC NEWS, Nov. 27, 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/asia-pacific/8382118.stm (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
28 Doyle, supra note 23; Open Society Justice Initiative, supra note 18.
29 Id.
30 The Cambodian Penal Code art. 500 (1956).
31 Id. arts. 501 & 503-508.
32 Open Society Justice Initiative, supra note 18.
33 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Case Information 001, 2009, available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/1 (last visited on Apr. 15, 2011).  
34 Doyle, supra note 23.
35 Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under
Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea art. 12(2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/
228B (June 6, 2003).
36 Open Society Justice Initiative, supra note 18.
37 INTRODUCTION TO THE KHMER ROUGE TRIALS (3d ed. 2008), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/
publications/ an_introduction_to_Khmer_Rouge_Trials_3th.pdf.  (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
38 Christopher Shay, The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: Cambodia’s Healing Process, TIME, Nov. 30, 2009, available at
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1943373,00.html (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
ECCC and millions more Cambodians followed the tribunal on television and radio.39
Thus, the chamber struck a good balance between the need to conduct an efficient trial
and the need to publicly present a complete picture of the atrocities committed at S-21
Prison, Duch’s alleged role in committing them, and the place of the prison in the
Khmer Rouge regime. The Court properly permitted the parties to present evidence on
all factual aspects of the case.40 The testimony of twenty-two civil parties who spoke
about their personal experiences at S-21 or the loss of family members added depth to
thorough public understanding of the suffering caused by the operations at the prison.41
Duch admitted guilt, but contended that everything he did was by the order of others.42
However, the major surprise came on the final day of the trial when Duch outraged the
UN-backed War Crime Tribunal by asking them to release him on the grounds that he
was not a member of the Khmer Rouge hierarchy.43 The judges did not pay heed to
Duch’s preposterous request and closed the proceedings.44 On July 26, 2010, the
Tribunal delivered its judgment against Duch.45
2. Judgment Delivered by the ECCC in Case 001
The ECCC found in Case 001 that Duch “willingly and zealously”46 instituted and
implemented a streamlined apparatus of torture to ensure that all detainees at S-21
confessed to betrayal of the regime, thus rationalising subsequent ‘smashing.’47
Moreover, by his own confession, Duch personally ordered and oversaw the torture of
detainees,48 which routinely included beatings, electrocution, asphyxiation with plastic
bags, and water-boarding.49 Torturers tore off and punctured prisoners’fingernails and
toenails, inserted needles into them, and force-fed them their own excrement and
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39 Id.
40 Open Society Justice Initiative, supra note 18.
41 Id.
42 Khmer Rouge Leader Admits Crimes, BBC NEWS, Mar. 31, 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/7973463.stm (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
43 Khmer Rouge Chief Stuns Court with Release Bid, BBC NEWS, Nov. 27, 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/asia-pacific/8382118.stm (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
44 Id.
45 Khmer Rouge Prison Chief Duch found Guilty, BBC NEWS, July 26, 2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-asia-pacific-10757320 (last visited on Oct. 20, 2010).
46 Case 001, supra note 24, at 393. 
47 Id. at 155 (noting that detainees were forced to confess to conspiratorial allegiances with the Central Intelligence
Agency, KGB, or Vietnamese Communist Party- entities of which many detainees had never heard of). 
48 Id. at 176 (recounting Duch’s confession that “[i]f the prisoners did not give satisfactory confessions, then I would
annotate on the confessions that they had to use more torture in order to get the confessions, and I was the one to
decide to order the interrogators to torture more”).
49 Id. at 241.
urine.50 The torture included psychological abuse, with detainees forced to pay homage
to images of dogs, which “in the Cambodian cultural context . . . caused victims extreme
humiliation and severe emotional distress.”51 Further, Duch personally ordered that
certain detainees be subjected to medical experiments between their interrogation and
their deaths at the Killing Fields.52 Despite his admitted awareness that “much of the
information [offered] in the confessions”elicited from such brutal interrogation
techniques ‘was fabricated,’53 Duch sanctioned these atrocities under the circular logic
of “justify[ing] the decision to arrest the [confessing] detainee”in the first place.54
Moreover, detainees were forced to reveal an imagined “network of traitors ... in the[ir]
confession”who were then “investigated and eventually arrested,”55 thus implicating
the detainees themselves in perpetuating the disparaging horror of S-21.
For the abovementioned crimes, which the Court deemed “crimes against
humanity”and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,56 the Trial Chamber
of the ECCC sentenced Duch to thirty-five years in prison. However, he would be
required to serve only nineteen years as his conviction was reduced by sixteen years,
which are 5 years for being held in illegal military detention from 1999 to 2007 and
eleven years for time already served behind bars.57 If the Trial Chamber’s sentence is
upheld on appeal,58 Duch, if alive, will walk free in 2029 at the age of eighty-six which
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50 Id. at 242-244, 249-250. 
51 Id. at 243.
52 Id. at 182, 275.
53 Id. at 179.
54 Id. at 254.
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 567. In particular, the ECCC found Duch guilty of “the following offences as “crimes against humanity”:
murder, extermination, enslavement, imprisonment, torture, persecution on political grounds, and other inhumane
acts”and “the following grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949: wilful killing, torture and inhumane
treatment, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or
civilian of the rights of a fair and regular trial, and unlawful confinement of a civilian.”Id. He was, however, not
convicted for the charges of torture and murder brought against him under the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code in the
absence of necessary supermajority. The International Judges argued that the statute of limitations had expired
whilst the Cambodian Judges maintained that this limitation period should only begin from 1993 since Cambodia did
not have a functioning judiciary that could have prosecuted Duch for the crimes of torture and murder before then
(1993). Trial Chamber, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Decision on the Defence Preliminary
Objection Concerning the Statute of Limitations of Domestic Crimes, July 26, 2010, available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/637/20100726_Preliminary_Objection_Case_001_ENG_PUBLIC.pdf
(last visited on Nov. 10, 2010).
57 Case 001, supra note 24, at 631-633.
58 The prosecution filed an appeal against the judgment with the Supreme Court Chamber of the ECCC seeking a
revised sentence of life imprisonment, with a reduction to 45 years in recognition of the violation of his rights (the
unlawful detention by the Cambodian Military Court) and what they consider to have been minimal cooperation with
the court. Open Society Justice Initiative, Recent Developments at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (Dec. 2010), available at  http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/
essentially means that he will spend less than the same number of days in prison as the
number of persons killed in the Tuol Sleng Prison S-21.59
a) The Trial Chamber’s reasoning for the Sentence Imposed against Duch
The Trial Chamber’s deliberation of sentencing in Case 001 is brief, indecisive and
unsatisfactory. It devoted merely eighteen (18) of its two hundred and eighty one (281)
page opinion, discussing the appropriate punishment for Duch’s crimes, even though
the factual and legal issues with which it dealt were relatively straightforward given
that Duch acknowledged his legal and moral responsibilities for the crimes committed
at Tuol Sleng Prison.60 The Court considered only four aggravating circumstances: (1)
Duch’s “abuse of power;”(2) his ‘cruelty;’(3) his ‘discriminatory intent;’and (4) “the
defencelessness of the victims.”It also balanced them against five mitigating
circumstances: (1) his “cooperation with the ECCC”which facilitated the proceedings
before the Chamber and “assisted ... national reconciliation;”(2) his “expressions of
remorse;”(3) his propensity for rehabilitation; (4) his admission of responsibility; and (5)
the “‘coercive environment’61 .... in which he functioned.”62 The court then jumped to
the conclusion that Duch deserved “full credit for the entirety of his [pre-trial] detention
and an additional sentencing credit for the period which was unlawful and in violation
his rights to a trial within reasonable time,”63 somehow settling on a sentence of
nineteen years without any additional discussion. Whereas the upper limit of
sentencing (life imprisonment) itself is still a grossly inadequate punishment for Duch’s
horrific crimes,64 discounts on sentencing have exposed the appalling disproportionality
between Duch’s crimes and his sentence. Even if the Court had actually followed in
practice65 the international precedent, established in Prosecutor v. Aleksovski,66 which
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articles_publications/publications/cambodia-report-20101207/cambodia-khmer-rouge-report-20101207.pdf (last visited
on Dec. 15, 2010). 
59 Duch will spend only 6,935 (19 x 365)  days in prison for the 16,000 people killed in the Tuol Sleng Prison. Robin
McDowell, For Most Cambodians, ‘Justice’has Little Meaning, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 8, 2010, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=11353172 (last visited on Dec. 15, 2010).
60 Case 001, supra note 24, at 47 & 570.
61 The Court appeared to reject Duch’s arguments that duress and superior orders be considered further mitigating
factors, yet then curiously introduced the issue of Duch’s ‘coercive environment’when laying down its sentence. Id.
at 629.
62 Case 001, supra note 24, at 601, 609-611, 629.
63 Id. at 624. See also id. at 623-627. 
64 Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, 1146 (Sept. 27, 2006) (noting that, given the gravity of the
crimes facing international tribunals, “a sentence, however harsh, will never be able to rectify the wrongs”
committed by guilty defendants).
65 The Court claimed that it had followed this precedent. Case 001, supra note 24, at 582.
66 Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment (Mar. 24, 2000).
states that “the gravity of the crime committed is ‘the litmus test for the appropriate
sentence,’”67 life in prison should have been the lenient baseline for a proportionality
calculation. Article 39 of the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia indeed empowers the Court to sentence any person guilty of
“crimes against humanity”68 and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,69
to life imprisonment.
Therefore, in the absence of any clarification as to how the Court arrived at the initial
thirty-five year sentence, it seems that the Trial Chamber subconsciously ‘anchored’at
the forty years sentence requested by the prosecution and the thirty years maximum
sentence under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court70 and then
adjusted inward to arrive at the thirty-five year sentence. 
b) Reaction of the Victims and Public to the Judgment
Obviously, it is the infliction of maximum possible punishment that gratifies the feeling
of the victims of outrageous crimes. As such, the maximum sentences delivered by
hybrid tribunals such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone71 in high profile cases like
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (RUF Case)72 were met with positive reactions
from the victims of the decade-long civil war.73 The punishment handed down to Duch
by the ECCC, however, could not at all satisfy the surviving victims of his torture.
Chum Mey, one of the three living survivors of the Tuol Sleng Prison, left the court in
disgust on hearing the sentence.74 Public reaction was also sharp and startling,
channelling disbelief and dismay with elegantly simple retributive logic: “People lost ...
their wives, their husbands, their sons and daughters ... they are dead now.”A
Cambodian woman recalled, “so why should [Duch] be able to get out in 19 years and
spend time with his grandchildren?”75 Furthermore, a brutal killer like Duch, who is
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67 Id. at 182.
68 The Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers art. 5 (amended Oct. 27, 2004),  NS/RKM/1004/006.
69 Id. art. 6.
70 Case 001, supra note 24, at 592-94.
71 The Special Court for Sierra Leone was set up in 2002 jointly by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United
Nations. It is mandated to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for the killing of 50,000 people and the
mutilation of the bodies of thousands in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996.
72 Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Sentencing Judgment (Apr. 8, 2009). In this case, former Revolutionary United Front
(“RUF”) ‘interim leader’Issa Hassan Sesay was sentenced by the Court to 52 years in prison for war crimes and
“crimes against humanity.”Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Sentencing Judgment (Apr. 8, 2009).
73 S Leone trio guilty of war crimes, BBC NEWS, Feb. 25, 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
7910841.stm (last visited on April 3, 2011). 
74 BBC News, supra note 45.
75 Seth Mydans, Prison Term for Khmer Rouge Jailer Leaves Many Dissatisfied, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010; Kuong Ly,
Justice Denied for Cambodians, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/
responsible for the death of 16,000 people, has been sentenced by the ECCC to only
nineteen years in prison while low-level drug dealers in Cambodia are sentenced to life
imprisonment. 76
Supporters of the ECCC, however, expressed their satisfaction over the reality that,
after three decades, a prominent member of the Khmer Rouge had at last been brought
to justice. Youk Chhang, Director of the Documentation Centre of the Cambodia, urged
the Cambodians to look beyond the lenience of Duch’s sentence and ponder on Case
001’s broader, abstract significance. He said, 
The ECCC could sentence [Duch] to more than 14, 000 years ... and even that
wouldn’t make it fair .... By recognising the illegality of Duch’s pre-trial detention
and reducing his sentence accordingly, the verdict ... provides ... a model for fair
trials in Cambodia. [Further, it offers] official accountability. This is the most
important Court legacy: a final judgment recognising the crimes committed by the
Khmer Rouge.77
B. Trial of Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Khieu
Samphan [Case 002]
1. Case Summaries
From September 19 to November 19, 2007, the following four Khmer Rouge leaders
were detained by the ECCC.
Nuon Chea
On September 19, 2007, Nuon Chea, the chief political ideologist of the Khmer Rouge
and right-hand man of the Khmer Rouge founder Pol Pot, was arrested and put in
the custody of the Tribunal.78 Commonly known as “Brother Number Two,”Nuon
Chea was second in command to Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge,79 and, as
such, was the highest ranking official detained. Although he is quoted in an
interview with the Associated Press in September 2007 as being ready to face the
tribunal, he has consistently denied any wrongdoing. In the interview he claimed, “I
was President of the National Assembly and had nothing to do with the operation of
Ⅳ 	
  203
opinion/03iht-edkuong.html (last visited on Dec. 15, 2010).
76 McDowell, supra note 59.
77 Documentation Centre of Cambodia, The Duch Verdict: Khmer Roug Tribunal Case 001 (2010), available at
www.dccam.org/Archives/Photographs/Exhibition_Khmer_RougeTribunal_Case_001--The_Duch_%27s_Verdict.pdf.
(last visited on Dec. 13, 2010).
78 Case of Nuon Chea, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Provisional Detention Order (Sept. 19, 2007).
79 BBC News, supra note 22.
the government.”He also claimed, “[s]ometimes I didn't know what they were doing
because I was in the Assembly.”80
Ieng Sary
Former Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary, also known as
“Brother Number Three,”was the third person to be detained by the Tribunal on
November 14, 2007.81 As the Foreign Minister of the Khmer Rouge Regime, he was
often the only point of contact between the regime concerned and the outside
world.82 He was responsible for convincing many educated Cambodians who had
fled the Khmer Rouge to return to help rebuild the country.83 Many of those who
returned were then tortured and executed as a part of the purge of intellectuals.84
Ieng Thirith
Ieng Thirith, wife of Ieng Sary, was one of the Khmer Rouge’s founding members
and the most powerful woman.85 She was the regime’s Minister for Social Affairs.86
Her sister was married to the regime’s leader, Pol Pot.87 Prosecutors believe that she
knew about tens of thousands of people dying from starvation and disease on brutal
collective farms, but did nothing to stop the disaster.88
Khieu Samphan
Khieu Samphan, the Khmer Rouge’s former official Head of the State, was the fifth
leader to be arrested on November 19, 2007 in Phnom Penh when he left the hospital
where he had been treated for a stroke suffered on November 13, 2007.89 He was the
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80 Jerry Harmer, Former Khmer Rouge Leader Detained, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 19, 2007, available at
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/CTM/Associated%20Press%207.20.07.pdf?phpMyAdmin=8319ad34ce0db941ff04d8c
788f6365e&phpMyAdmin=ou7lpwtyV9avP1XmRZP6FzDQzg3&phpMyAdmin=KZTGHmT45FRCAiEg7OLlzXFdNJ4
(last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
81 Case of Ieng Sary, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Provisional Detention Order (Nov. 14, 2007).
82 BBC News, supra note 22.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. 
86 Jared Ferrie, Tribunal Charges Khmer Rouge ‘First Lady’with Genocide, REUTERS, Dec. 21, 2009, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5BK17H20091221 (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
87 BBC News, supra note 22.
88 Id.
89 Case of Khieu Samphan, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Provisional Detention Order (Nov. 19, 2007);
Sopheng Cheang, Ex-Khmer Rouge Head of State Arrested, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 19, 2007, available at
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/CTM/AP%2011-19-07.pdf?phpMyAdmin=8319ad34ce0db941ff04d8c788f6365e&
phpMyAdmin=ou7lpwtyV9avP1XmRZP6FzDQzg3&phpMyAdmin=KZTGHmT45FRCAiEg7OLlzXFdNJ4 (last visited on
Mar. 10, 2010).
public face of the Khmer Rouge.90 According to the Prosecutors, Khieu Samphan
aided and abetted the policies of the Khmer Rouge, which were “characterised by
murder, extermination, imprisonment, persecution on political grounds and other
inhumane acts.”91 Although he has never denied these deaths, he and his lawyers
insist that, as Head of the State, he was never directly involved in the acts alleged.92
2. The Result of the Investigation 
Although the investigations against the four senior-most living members of the Khmer
Rouge regime, i.e. Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Khieu Samphan, began in
July 2007, it was completed only (after more than 3 years) on September 15, 2010, when
the Co-Investigating Judges of the ECCC entered the 739 page closing order indicting all
of the four. The Investigating Judges in the closing order charged the four with the
following grounds: (a) “crimes against humanity;93 (b) Genocide;94 (c) Grave breaches of
the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949;95 (d) Violations of the 1956 Cambodian
Penal Code;96 and (e) Joint Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”) as a mode of liability.97
It goes without saying that, the ECCC was fortunate that its first trial involved an
accused who was as cooperative and articulate as Duch. The cooperation of Duch and
his counsel made it much easier for the prosecution, which has the burden of proving
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92 Genocide Charge for Khmer Rouge Leader Khieu Samphan, BBC NEWS, Dec. 18, 2009, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8419789.stm (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
93 Closing Order, Case File 002, Sept. 15, 2010, para. 1613, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/
courtDoc/740/D427Eng.pdf (last visited on Dec. 15, 2010). In particular, the ECCC charged the four with the
following offences as “crimes against humanity”: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment,
torture, rape, persecution on political, racial and religious grounds and other inhuman acts.
94 Id. Specifically, the ECCC accused the four with the offence of killing members of the groups of Vietnamese and
Cham.  
95 Id. In particular, the ECCC indicted the four with the following grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949:
wilful killing, torture or inhumane treatment, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or civilian the rights of fair and regular trial and unlawful deportation or
unlawful confinement of civilian.
96 Id. Specifically the Court the termed the following crimes as violations of the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code: homicide,
torture and religious persecution. 
97 Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Order on the Application
at the ECCC of the Form of Liability Known as Joint Criminal Enterprise, December 8, 2009, No. D97/13. Joint
Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”) eliminates the need to show that the accused physically perpetrated the crime in order
to hold him/her individually responsible. There are three forms of JCE; the first is when a group shares a common
intent to commit a crimes, the second is when actions are taken in “a common concerted system of ill-treatment,”
and the third, and most broad, covers crimes that were the foreseeable consequence of a common plan. The
applicability of JCE at the ECCC means that there is less of a burden on the prosecution to link individual
defendants to specific crimes and there can instead be a focus on proving that crimes occurred and that they
resulted from the policies of the leaders of the Khmer Rouge.
the elements of all the crimes charged,98 and the Trial Chamber, responsible for trial
management and the primary questioning of all witnesses, to clearly demonstrate the
role of Duch in relation to S-21 Prison.99 All indications are that those advantages will
not be present when the Court begins the trial of Case 002, probably by the middle of
2011,100 against the said four senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge.101 Unlike Duch, these
four defendants who held high-level positions in the Khmer Rouge have denied
complicity in war crimes and refused to apologise.102 Theng Sary, a survivor of the
Khmer Rouge regime who is now a human rights lawyer in Phnom Penh, is of the
opinion that Case 002 will make Duch’s case look like a ‘cake walk.’103 Therefore, it
appears that this trial will present the prosecution and the court with extremely
formidable challenges in presenting evidence of the complex charges which include
genocide and liability based on a joint criminal enterprise, and in telling a
comprehensible story of the senior leadership of the Khmer Rouge.
III. Elements Presently Undermining the 
Credibility of the ECCC
The credibility of the ECCC has seriously been undermined by the failure of the
Tribunal and its stakeholders to effectively address the factors of: (1) political
interference in the judicial process; (2) failure to address the allegations of corruption by
not implementing a credible anticorruption programme; and (3) deliberate strategies to
stall the legal process.
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98 Internal Rules of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Rev. 2) Rule 87 (2008), available at
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/CTM/Internal_Rules_Revision2_05-01-08_En.pdf?phpMyAdmin=
8319ad34ce0db941ff04d8c788f6365e&phpMyAdmin=ou7lpwtyV9avP1XmRZP6FzDQzg3&phpMyAdmin=KZTGHmT45
FRCAiEg7OLlzXFdNJ4 (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010).
99 Open Society Justice Initiative, supra note 18.
100 Open Society Justice Initiative, Salvaging Independence: The Need for a Principled Completion Plan for the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, available at  http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/
international_justice/articles_publications/publications/khmer-rouge-tribunal-20101110/cambodia-khmer-rouge-
20101110.pdf (last visited on Dec. 5. 2010); Khmer Rouge leaders indicted by Cambodian genocide tribunal, GUARDIAN
(UK), Sept. 16, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/16/khmer-rouge-leaders-indicted (last
visited on Dec. 5, 2010).
101 Id.
102 Shay, supra note 38.
103 Id.
A. Political Interference in the Judicial Process 
Independence of judiciary is sine qua non for a democratic society proclaiming the rule of
law. The most traditional and central meaning of the independence of judiciary is that
the judges are in a position to arrive at their decisions free from interference of the
political branches, especially the executive, and from apprehension for suffering
personally as a result of exercising judicial powers.104 This noble concept, however, has
not found its favour in Cambodia, where the political structure is characterised by a
corrupt executive with a long history of interfering with its weak judiciary.105 High
political officials instruct Cambodian judges to rule in a certain way especially in cases
involving political issues and threaten their safety if they do not rule as instructed.106
Since 1993, physical attacks on judges have frequently occurred. In April 2003,
moreover, a prominent judge was assassinated in the middle of the day as he drove to
work in Phnom Penh.107 In highly politicised cases, it is not uncommon for the
executive to negotiate prearranged pardons to demonstrate its power over the
judiciary.108
Taking into account the abovementioned realities, the UN Secretary General Mr.
Kofi Annan on March 31, 2003 opined in his report to the General Assembly that both
Chambers of the ECCC should be composed of a majority of international judges.109
The United Nations Group of Experts also advocated for a predominantly international
tribunal due to the long history of political interference on the Cambodian judicial
system.110 However, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen dismissed these conclusions.
Hun Sen even counter-proposed the creation of a joint tribunal with Cambodian
personnel in majority,111 which ultimately saw the light of the day. Many critics
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of the Judiciary under the Constitutions of Bangladesh and Malaysia: A Comparative Study 5, 9 & 10 (2011)
(Unpublished LL.M. dissertation, University of Malaya) (on file with author).
105 Human Rights Watch, Serious Flaw: Why the UN General Assembly Should Require Changes to the Draft Khmer
Rouge Tribunal Agreement 3-4, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/04/30/serious-flaws-why-un-general-
assembly-should-require-changes-draft-khmer-rouge-tr (last visited March 10, 2010). 
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Amnesty International, Kingdom of Cambodia, Amnesty International’s Position and Concerns Regarding the
Proposed ‘Khmer Rouge’Tribunal, ASA 23/005/2003 (2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/3f12fb834.html (last visited on Mar. 10, 2010)
109 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on Khmer Rouge Trials, U.N. Doc. A/57/769, 11 (Mar. 31,
2003).
110 Scott Luftglass, Crossroads in Cambodia: The United Nation’s Responsibility to Withdraw Involvement from the
Establishment of a Cambodian Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge, 90 VA. L. REV. 893, 909 (2004).
111 Id. at 911-912. 
lambasted Hun Sen’s insistence on the establishment of a joint tribunal that was
fundamentally domestic in character as a ploy to dictate the proceedings112 of the court.
This move by Hun Sen to establish a Tribunal that was composed mostly of Cambodian
personnel thus cast serious doubts over his sincerity, as manifested in his letter on 21
June 1997 addressed to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan,113 to bring to justice those
Khmer Rouge leaders, responsible for war crimes, “crimes against humanity”and
genocide from 1975-1979. Judging by the recent appointment of judges with
questionable backgrounds, refusal by 6 witnesses holding government positions in
Cambodia to honour summons to give testimony before the investigating judges in
Case 002, and rejection by the Investigating Judges of the request to call Prime Minister
Hun Sen and other key government figures, one would obviously agree that the
criticisms were indeed well founded. 
1. Appointment of Judges with Questionable Backgrounds to Influence the
Proceedings of the ECCC   
The Cambodian Judges of the Tribunal, as pointed out earlier, are appointed by the
Cambodian Government without the requirement of any scrutiny by the UN. This
unfettered power rendered the Hun Sen government to appoint judges freely - many of
whom received their law degrees in the former Soviet Communist bloc, such as East
Germany, Russia, Kazakhstan and Vietnam, where carrying out the state’s wishes
perhaps counted for more than maintaining the appearance of impartiality114 - closely
associated with Hun Sen’s political party. Among these judges, the appointments of (1)
Ney Thol (President of the Military Court and also a member of the Central Committee
of Hun Sen’s ruling CPP, who presided over two major trials where Hun Sen’s political
opponents were convicted of national security related crimes)115 to the Pre-Trial
Chamber, (2) Thou Mony (who ruled twice against the supposed killers of Chea Vichea,
a trade unionist who was allegedly assassinated on the orders of ‘someone’in the
Cambodian Government,116 and once overturned a lower court’s guilty ruling against
Hun Sen’s nephew, who had been involved in a shooting spree in 2003 in which two
people were killed and two other wounded)117 to the Trial Chamber, and (3) Nil Non
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117 Munthit K, Cambodia Judges Credibility Questioned, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 22, 2006, available at
(who himself confessed of taking bribes from parties in court cases he judged) to the
Trial Chamber as its President,118 bear testimony of the evil design of manipulating the
trial process by the Regime. Moreover, it is worth mentioning here that, two of the
aforesaid three controversial judges, i.e. Thou Mony and Nil Non (as the President),
both of whom sit in the Trial Chamber, may have played a major role in ‘anchoring’the
lenient verdict against Duch in Case 001 in deference to the dictates of the hierarchy of
the Cambodian Government which is quite consistent with their past notorious
reputation of being unduly influenced by their political supervisor.
2. Refusal of Six Witnesses Holding Government Positions to Honour Summons 
The apprehensions of political interference were heightened when six high government
officials refused to honour summons to give testimony before the investigating judges
in Case 002119 and Prime Minister Hun Sen himself publicly encouraged this refusal.
Hun Sen even went so far as saying that if the foreign officials involved in the tribunal
are not satisfied with the refusal of government officials to testify before them, then they
“can pack up their clothes and return home.”120 This statement made by the Prime
Minister reflects the total disregard of his Government’s direct obligation under Article
25 of the Agreement (concluded between the Royal Government of Cambodia and the
UN) to assist the investigating judges in actions, including the “service of documents.”121
3. Rejection by the Investigating Judges of the Request to Call Hun Sen and
Other Senior Government Officials  
On March 1, 2010, Investigating Judges, Marcel Lemonde and You Bunleng, declined to
comply with the request of the defence teams of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan to call
Prime Minister Hun Sen to testify along with Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, Finance
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Minister Keat Chhon and other senior government leaders.122 Judge You Bungleng
reasoned that these senior officials were not likely to provide any additional evidence
and, as such, there was no justification of interviewing them.123
4. Interference in the Investigation of Additional Suspects
Apprehensions of political interference in the investigation work of the ECCC were
escalated in December 2008 when the Cambodian Co-Prosecutor, Chea Leang, would
not agree with the International Co-Prosecutor at that time Robert Petit to the
investigation of five additional suspects beyond the five named defendants.124 The
reasons she provided to justify her position had nothing to do with the sufficiency of the
evidence or the legal basis for additional investigations, but were political in nature and
aligned with the long- held views of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen who has long
wanted to limit the trials to his political enemies and who resisted efforts which brought
people in positions of power (or whose patrons) before the court.125
However, in August 2009, nine months after the International Prosecutor’s filing of
disagreement notice concerning the submission of the names of five additional suspects
for judicial investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued a divided ruling that allowed the
submission to go forward.126 Following the public announcement of this decision, the
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen bluntly stated his objection to bring charges
against any additional accused, implying that it would result in social unrest that may
kill 200,000 to 300, 000 people.127 On October 27, 2010, Hun Sen overtly told the UN
Secretary General Mr. BAN Ki-moon during a meeting in Phnom Penh that: “Cases
003/004 will not be allowed ... The Court will try the four senior leaders successfully
and then finish with Case 002.”128 These statements of the Prime Minister crystallize the
concern about the future of the Case 003/004, as it is alleged that the Cambodian
members of the Staff at the ECCC are now being forced to adhere to Hun Sen’s political
direction by refusing to cooperate and participate in the investigation of the five
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additional suspects in Cases 003/004.129
The independence of the ECCC has been severely undermined, as it is the hierarchy
of the Cambodian Government, and not the Judges of the ECCC, who are deciding
whom to charge, what to charge and who should testify. This direct interference in the
investigation is a clear violation of the Cambodian Government’s commitments under
the provisions laid down in Articles 5(3), 12(2) and 13(1) of the Agreement.130 The
Government has instructed or encouraged officials concerned to disregard court orders
and refuse to undertake investigations in contravention, not only of the
abovementioned three provisions of the Agreement, but also of the provisions of the
UN Basic Principles on the Independence of Judiciary, 1985 which in Articles 1 and 4
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expressly state that: 
The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State .... It is the duty of
all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of
the judiciary.131
There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial
process.132
B. Failure to Address the Allegations of Corruption by Not
Implementing a Credible Anticorruption Programme
Corruption within the ECCC is such a severe problem133 that requires the UN and other
major stakeholders to take effective measures so as to ensure that their money is well
spent. The complaints of corruption at the ECCC were first brought to the notice of the
UN by the Cambodian staffs134 when they claimed that they had to give money in
exchange for their jobs.135 These complaints were followed by a call from the Open
Society Justice Initiative, a watchdog NGO, trying to set up an independent
investigation mechanism for accusations of corruption.136 Ultimately, on February 23,
2008, a high-level UN delegation met the Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Sok An,
and issued a joint statement to the effect that an agreement has been reached involving
continuing parallel domestic and international mechanisms to investigate corruption.137
However, this statement was ambiguous and unclear as to the specifics of the said
mechanisms and, as such, smacked of political compromise.
After about a year of negotiations, on August 11, 2009, the Government of Cambodia
and the UN signed the Agreement to Establish an Independent Counsellor at the
Extraordinary Chambers for the Courts in Cambodia.138 This Agreement provided the
skeletal outline of an anticorruption program that might, if properly developed, be a
step toward both ensuring that ECCC staff have a safe and effective remedy if they are
aware of or subjected to corrupt practices. Thus, it might also set to secure the credibility
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of the Court impaired by almost three years of inadequate addressing of corruption
allegations. In recent, however, significant concerns have been expressed about the
independence of the ‘Independent Counsellor’charged with running the programme
because of his role as the head of the Cambodia National Audit Authority, a body that
should have been independent of the Cambodian Government in theory.139
Since the announcement of the plan on August 11, 2009, the Independent Counsellor
has visited the Court and held a single press conference. There, he promised to be
accessible to all staff.140 He expressed the intention to collect information relating to all
corruption and other complaints from court staffs, and would be involved in resolving
those deemed to be ‘well-founded.’141 These limited promises appear to be empty as
no significant action has been taken by him thus far, i.e. he has not yet revealed publicly,
or to the staff of the ECCC, what procedures are in place to ensure protection and
anonymity for whistleblowers, how to contact him, the nature and limit of his power to
investigate charges, and other critical elements that are a prerequisite to an effective
programme.142
In a statement at the end of March 2010, the Cambodia National Authority
announced that the Independent Counsellor had begun investigations into three
received complaints, of which two were from Cambodian staff and one from a UN staff
member. It was also announced by the Independent Counsellor’s office that a public
report of his work would be available in July 2010.143 Contrary to this announcement,
the Independent Counsellor declared on October 18, 2010 that he would not publish a
report summarising the activities of his office in pursuance of UN’s instructions.144 The
non-publication of the Report of the Independent Counsellor calls into question the
openness and transparency of the entire anticorruption process at the ECCC. 
139 Robbie Corey-Boulet, Corruption Counsel’s Role at ECCC Unclear, PHNOM PENH POST, Sept. 23, 2009, quoting
expressions of concerns about the independence of the appointed independent counselor: “Sophal Ear, a professor at
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Street Journal oyttp-ed that the selection of Uth Chhorn in particular was troubling [because of his position as head
of the National Audit Authority (“NAA”)]. . . . he said the NAA’s lack of transparency had robbed it of all credibility,
adding: “Since the auditor general and the independent counsellor will be one and the same, this does not bode well
for the credibility of the ECCC.”The NAA, which began its work in 2002 and is tasked with auditing all government
bodies, is officially independent under the Law on Audit. However, a 2008 review by the nonprofit Global Integrity
stated: The NAA is believed to not be politically independent, even by law. See Sophal Ear, Opinion: Cambodian
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The non-strengthening of the anticorruption mechanism at the ECCC, which results
from lack of determination on the part of key stakeholders, severely undermines the
Court’s credibility. As one observer noted, “... corruption is one key issue that simply
can’t be ignored. The ECCC cannot make survivors of Democratic Kampuchea whole
for the abuses they suffered. What it can do is deliver ... credible verdicts and the
promise of a judicial system that will better protect ... Cambodians’rights in the future.”145
It is believed that, the UN, the donors, and the Cambodian Government show their
seriousness towards the adoption of a resolution concerning anticorruption mechanism
only when critical funding is needed for the court. Once the immediate pressure for
funding is off, discussions and progress regarding the matter come to an end. Because
of this kind of ‘window dressing,’the court and the UN will have difficulty in
convincing court staff and Cambodians whether they have any sincere plan to solve the
corruption problems faced by the Court.146
C. Deliberate Strategies to Stall the Legal Process  
Manifestly, the Cambodians prolonged the process of establishing the ECCC in a
calculated and planned manner so that a certain number of most notorious Khmer
Rouge leaders including Pol Pot, the man most wanted for “crimes against humanity,”
Son Sen, Defense Minister and responsible for the Santebal, the Political Police, Yun Yat,
Minister, Thiounn Thioeunn, Minister, Ta Mok ‘the Butcher,’the Regime’s Chief of
Military Command and one of Pol Pot’s most ruthless henchmen, and his deputy Ke
Pauk, having died in the interim, could never brought to justice.147 
The trial of Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thrith, and Khieu Samphan, as mentioned
earlier, is not expected to commence before mid-2011.148 This inordinate delay in trying
these aging (most of them also in ill health149) atrocity lords may also be deliberately
planned so that some or all of the defendants involved in this case may not be alive to
face the tribunal.150 In this context, the views of Vanna Chan, daughter of a Cambodian
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genocide survivor, are worthy of note that “they [Cambodian Government Officials]
may stall [the legal process] so much that all the remaining key Khmer Rouge officials
will die of old age.”151
It cannot reasonably be expected that “Hun Sen and his CPP would allow the Khmer
Rouge Trial to be completed soon and according to international standard of justice,”152
when all the high-profile crimes including the politically motivated ‘Grenade Attack’of
March 30, 1997, the murder of union activists’politicians, prominent monks, reporters
and recent forced removal of people from their land are still unresolved.153
IV. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion reveals that the establishment of the ECCC which was
designed as a national court with ‘extraordinary’international character, following an
agreement reached between the UN and Cambodia after 26 years of genocide,
demonstrates that impunity will not be successful in Cambodia for surviving senior
Khmer Rouge leaders or others most accused of the atrocity crimes of the Pol Pot regime
committed between 1975 and 1979. This establishment alone sends a powerful message
throughout the world that the international community is getting more serious about
accountability for atrocity crimes and that there is no stopwatch for justice. 
However, the progress ECCC achieved by successfully completing the trial of Kaing
Guek Eav, has, to a great extent, been tarnished by the judgment delivered by the
Tribunal in this case, and the failure of the Tribunal and its stakeholders (including the
UN) in addressing certain existing problems of profound nature like blatant and naked
political interference, corruption, and delaying tactics resorted to by the Cambodian
officials at the ECCC. To proceed with the trials, without properly addressing the
political interference and allegations of corruption, obviously risks tainting the entire
process and casting a shadow over any legal outcomes. Furthermore, such a
dispensation of justice would create an imperfect and unhealthy precedent of the UN
acquiescence to a regime seeking to profit from and control internationally-backed
tribunals. Joseph Mussomeli, the United States Ambassador to Cambodia, has aptly
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said, “the only thing worse than no trial is a trial that is a farce.”154 It should be kept in
mind that, if the ECCC does not adjudicate the cases brought before it in a free,
impartial and independent manner, justice to be administered by it would be a
meaningless word. As Viscount Bryce said, “.... if the law be dishonestly administered,
the salt has lost its savour; if it be weakly or fitfully enforced, the guarantees or order fail
... If the lamp of justice goes out in darkness, how great is that darkness!”155 What
matters most is the upholding of the public and international community’s perception
of the independence and impartiality of the judges, which is well reflected in the oft-
quoted maxim that: “Justice must not only be done, but must also be seen to be done.”
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